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Beyond Backlash: Legal History,
Polarization, and Roe v. Wade
Mary Ziegler∗
Abstract
On its fortieth anniversary, Roe v. Wade serves as the most
prominent example of the damage judicial review can do to the
larger society. Scholars from across the ideological spectrum have
related how Roe helped to entrench the ideological positions held
by those on either side of the abortion issue, precluding any form
of productive compromise. This criticism, which the Article calls
the “beyond backlash” argument, has profound legal consequences,
serving as both a justification for overruling Roe and as a case
study of the benefits of varying interpretive methods.
This Article reevaluates the beyond backlash claim through a
careful historical study of the world of abortion politics in the
decade after Roe. It unearths a surprising set of negotiations
between activists who believed in shared solutions. Roe certainly
intensified conflict, prompting a nationalization of pro-life
activities and sparking an academic debate about judicial review.
Nonetheless, as the Article argues, the ideological entrenchment
we associate with Roe came later than we have thought and
emerged for reasons beyond the Court’s decision.
This Article uses this history as an entry point for rethinking
the uses to which post-Roe history is put in contemporary debate
about judicial review. The beyond backlash argument uses Roe as
shorthand for a wide array of strategic decisions and political
events. Disentangling the decision from the events following it will
allow scholars to have a more principled debate about what
responses to Roe actually teach us about the role of the courts. At a
minimum, the Article suggests that scholars have overstated the
degree to which Roe immediately polarized discussion. Until we
∗ Assistant Professor of Law at Florida State University College of Law.
The author would like to thank the staff of the Washington and Lee Law Review
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better understand the causes for the radicalization of abortion
politics, we should not rely so heavily on Roe in reasoning about
the consequences of judicial review.
As importantly, reexamining the beyond backlash narrative
makes apparent that polarization is neither inevitable nor beyond
the control of nonjudicial actors. If we wish to create a more
reasoned abortion debate, Roe cannot stop us from doing so.
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I. Introduction
In May 2013, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, perhaps the
strongest defender of abortion rights on the Supreme Court,
suggested that Roe v. Wade1 “stopped the momentum that was on

1.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the side of change.”2 As marriage-equality litigation continues to
move into the Supreme Court, Ginsburg’s comments have revived
discussion of Roe’s damaging effects. Most often, scholars focus on
the ways in which Roe set back the abortion cause, undercutting
the progress that the pro-choice movement had made.3
Conventionally, however, we believe that Roe’s impact went much
further. Scholars from Robin West to Jeffrey Rosen argue that
Roe helped to entrench the ideological positions held by those on
either side of the issue, precluding any form of productive
compromise.4 The polarization produced by Roe spilled over into
other legal conflicts about gender, helping to doom the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA), to energize the New Right and the
Religious Right, and to put off potentially promising alliances in
support of caretaking.5 Beyond backlash, Roe bequeathed to the

2. Emily Bazelon, Backlash Whiplash: Is Justice Ginsburg Right that Roe
v. Wade Should Make the Court Cautious About Gay Marriage?, SLATE (May 14,
2013, 3:08 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/
2013/05/justice_ginsburg_and_roe_v_wade_caution_for_gay_marriage.html (last
visited Apr. 15, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 468 (2004) (suggesting
that litigation alone “cannot fundamentally transform a nation”); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 520 (2001) (contending that Roe “undermine[d] [abortion]
right[s] by stimulating extra opposition to them”).
4. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 79, 124–
27 (2003) (discussing Roe as a pragmatic decision that had the effect of stifling
“potentially worthwhile social experimentation”); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST
DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA 96 (2006) (“[W]hen the
Supreme Court struck some of these abortion restrictions down in the late 1970s
and ’80s, it finally energized abortion opponents who otherwise would have had
to make their case in the political arena.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV.
381, 381–82 (1985) (“Roe v. Wade sparked public opposition and academic
criticism, in part, I believe, because the Court ventured too far in the change it
ordered and presented an incomplete justification for its action.” (footnote
omitted)); Cass Sunstein, Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s: Three Civil
Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 766 (1991) (using Roe as an example to
show that courts are not always the proper institution to bring about social
change); Robin West, From Free Choice to Reproductive Justice: Deconstitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1394–1404 (2009)
(describing the fact that Roe hangs by a thread, is subject to the political tides of
the president, and lacks criticisms from the pro-choice movement).
5. Infra Part II.
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American people what Emily Bazelon has called “the intractable,
depressing national divide over abortion.”6
Whereas backlash arguments address the harm judicial
decisions do to social-change movements, Roe’s critics focus on
the damage done by judicial intervention to the larger society.7
This criticism, which the Article calls the “beyond backlash”
argument, has profound legal consequences. Justice Antonin
Scalia has woven this argument into a demand for the overruling
of Roe.8 In the broader legal academy, scholars believe that postRoe polarization provides a powerful warning about the
consequences of particular interpretive methods—particularly,
when the Court decides too much too soon.9 Forty years after Roe,
the decision serves as a central example of the dangers of judicial
review.10
This Article reevaluates the beyond backlash claim through a
careful historical study of abortion politics in the decade after
Roe. It unearths a surprising set of negotiations between activists
who believed it possible to find common legal ground.11 Roe
certainly intensified conflict, prompting a nationalization of prolife activities and sparking an academic debate about judicial
review.12 Nonetheless, as the Article argues, the ideological
6. Bazelon, supra note 2.
7. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 766 (“Roe may have taken national policy
too abruptly to a point toward which it was groping more slowly, and in the
process may have prevented state legislatures from working out long-lasting
solutions based upon broad public consensus.” (footnote omitted)).
8. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998–
1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the political pressure on the
Court caused by Roe and arguing that if the Court did what it is supposed to
doread the Constitution and discern our society’s understanding of that
textthen the people would leave the Court alone).
9. See infra Part II (exploring this scholarship at greater length).
10. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 519 (citing Roe as an example of the
Court meddling too much in the political process).
11. Infra Part IV.
12. On the federalization of the abortion issue after Roe, see, for example,
Scott Idleman, Liberty in the Balance: Religion, Politics, and American
Constitutionalism, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991, 1021 (1996) (reviewing ISAAC
KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE
AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS (1996)) (“Roe . . . more or less ensured that
abortion would become a national issue and that abortion-related activism,
whether for or against, would become nationalized . . . .”). On the academic
debate sparked by Roe, see, for example, BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
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entrenchment we associate with Roe came later than we thought
and emerged for reasons beyond the Court’s decision.
The Article chronicles a complex effort on the part of
opposing activists to find consensus—if not on abortion, then on
the gender issues associated with it.13 Moderate pro-life activists
worked to redefine the legal right to choose, requiring
government support for a range of reproductive choices.14 Some in
the pro-choice movement supported some form of fetal rights,
considering them in the larger context of debate about medical
ethics, human experimentation, and human dignity.15 These
stories show that judicial review did not intensify abortion
conflict in the way we have often believed.
Furthermore, the Article provides compelling new evidence
that the polarization of the struggle increased at least partly
“without the intermediation of judicial review.”16 The dynamics of
gradual political party realignment in the 1970s, the mobilization
of the New Right and the Religious Right, the setbacks
confronted by the pro-choice movement, the emergence of
effective new pro-life litigation strategies, and the declining
popularity of the welfare state all helped to undermine
preexisting efforts to find common ground.17
The Article uses this history as an entry point for rethinking
the uses to which post-Roe history is put in contemporary debate
about judicial review. The beyond backlash argument uses Roe as
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED
THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 299–313 (2009) (discussing the intellectual

debate Roe sparked over how the Constitution should be interpreted and the
political backlash with the rise of the New Right).
13. See infra Part VI (discussing ways that activists on both sides of the
abortion debate could come together for certain causes such as contraceptives).
14. See Thomas W. Hilgers, Marjory Mecklenburg & Gayle Riordan, Is
Abortion the Best We Have to Offer?: A Challenge to the Aborting Society, in
ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 177, 180 (Thomas W. Hilgers & Dennis J. Horan
eds., 1972) (“Both those who favor and oppose abortion can agree that a woman
with a problem pregnancy needs help. The suggestions which follow represent
new ideas and an extension of the old.”).
15. See infra Part IV (discussing the pro-choice movement’s views of fetal
rights outside of the abortion context).
16. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade:
New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2033 (2011).
17. See infra Part V (explaining the various political changes occurring in
the 1970s that contributed to the political backlash of Roe).
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shorthand for a wide array of strategic decisions and political
events.18 Disentangling the decision from the events following it
will allow scholars to have a more principled debate about what
Roe actually teaches us about the role of the courts. At a
minimum, the Article suggests that scholars have overstated the
degree to which Roe immediately polarized discussion.19 Until we
better understand the causes of the radicalization of abortion
politics, we should not rely so heavily on Roe in reasoning about
the consequences of judicial review.
As importantly, reexamining the beyond backlash narrative
makes apparent that polarization is neither inevitable nor beyond
the control of nonjudicial actors. If we want to create a less
dysfunctional abortion politics, we have it in our power to do so.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly sets out the
beyond backlash narrative, examining the evidence offered for
Roe’s disastrous impact on national politics. Part III begins to
complicate this narrative. This Part recovers the lost history of
antiabortion efforts to define and protect some form of
reproductive choice for women. Tracing these efforts across legal
debates about healthcare, child care, family planning, and
pregnancy discrimination, the Article uncovers a new
antiabortion argument used in the years immediately after the
Supreme Court decided Roe. Abortion opponents argued that the
state could ban abortion only if it conferred rights on women after
pregnancy.20 For this reason, activists campaigned for reforms
that created new protections for caretakers, arguing that
reproductive choice lost meaning if the state did not support
women raising children.21
18. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 16, at 2086 (“We suggest . . . that
the dominance of the ‘Court-caused-it’ backlash narrative has shortchanged
both legal scholars and the general public of a more complete understanding of
an important chapter in America’s social, political, and legal history.”).
19. See id. at 2086–87 (discussing the fact that Roe was only one factor
among many in the polarization of abortion as a political issue in America);
infra Part VII (making conclusions based on the various historical, legal, and
political facts offered in the Article).
20. See Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the
Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1656
(2008) (“In the years after Roe, it was not the antiabortion movement that was
making claims about protecting women’s choices and women’s health; these were
the claims and frames of the movement’s abortion-rights adversaries.”).
21. Id.

BEYOND BACKLASH

975

Part IV examines pro-choice conversations about medical
experimentation, fetal life, and informed consent. In the midst of
scandals concerning medical exploitation and sterilization abuse,
some in the pro-choice movement worked to carve out a space for
fetal rights that did not conflict with Roe.22
Part V studies the reasons a world of possible compromise
gave way to one of greater ideological entrenchment. This Part
spotlights the role played by ongoing political party realignment,
the emergence of the New Right and the Religious Right in
American politics, and the ascendancy of incrementalist litigators
in the pro-life movement.
Part VI asks what this history teaches us about Roe’s last
forty years and its future ramifications, and Part VII briefly
concludes.
II. Beyond Backlash: Roe and American Politics
Conventional backlash arguments examine the impact of a
judicial decision on the cause it advances.23 As Michael Klarman
explains, a court “venturing too far in advance of public opinion”
might “undermine the cause” advanced by social movement
members.24 Klarman and Gerald Rosenberg focus primarily on
the utility of litigation as a source of social change.25 While
22. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION PRIVACY COMMITTEE MEETING
MINUTES, June 16, 1976, 1–2 [hereinafter ACLU MEETING MINUTES, June 1976]
(discussing protections for fetal rights that were consistent with Roe’s holdings
regarding fetus viability and the importance of the life of the mother) (on file
with Mudd Library, Princeton University, Box 112, The ACLU Papers, Folder 8
“Rare Books and Manuscripts Division”).
23. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 16, at 2032 (“The backlash
narrative conventionally identifies the Supreme Court’s decision as the cause of
polarizing conflict and imagines backlash as arising in response to the Court
repressing politics.” (footnote omitted)).
24. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS,
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 203 (2013).
25. See id. at 166
Not only do court decisions make people aware of previously
unnoticed social change and force politicians to take positions on
issues that they previously have ducked, but they also impose
substantive resolutions of policy issues that may be very different
from those supported by most voters. It is this aspect of judicial
decisions that is the most important cause of backlash.
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Rosenberg contends that the courts are largely ineffective in
reshaping social, moral, or political norms, Klarman suggests
that litigation can make things worse for the social movements
that the Court tried to help.26
However, criticisms of Roe go beyond the conventional
backlash narrative.27 Scholars, Supreme Court Justices, and
grassroots activists argue that the 1973 decision did broader
political damage.28 Richard Posner suggests that Roe cut off a
promising, state-by-state negotiation about the scope and
rationale of abortion rights.29 If the Court had not imposed a
single, national result on a divided polity, Posner reasons,
lawmakers might have arrived at an approach that commended
itself to those on both sides of the issue.30
Cass Sunstein and Jeffrey Rosen further contend that Roe
helped to radicalize broader American gender politics.31 In
Rosen’s view, Roe empowered extremists on either side who
See also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 422 (2d ed. 2008) (“U.S. courts can almost never be significant
producers of effective social reform.”).
26. Compare KLARMAN, supra note 3, at 422 (discussing the violent
outbursts across the country in reaction to Brown’s school desegregation), with
ROSENBERG, supra note 25, at 420–24 (concluding as to when and under what
conditions courts can produce significant social reform and using Brown and Roe
as examples).
27. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 766 (“[T]he decision may well have
created the Moral Majority, helped defeat the equal rights amendment, and
undermined the women’s movement by spurring opposition and demobilizing
potential adherents.” (footnote omitted)).
28. See Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 381–83 (discussing how Roe went too far
in taking a “medical approach” and the implications of this medical approach);
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 766 (discussing the implications of Roe); Mary Ziegler,
The Possibility of Compromise: Anti-Abortion Moderates After Roe v. Wade, 87
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 572 (2012) [hereinafter Ziegler, Possibility of
Compromise] (discussing STOP ERA’s belief that Roe affected its efforts).
29. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 125 (“[B]ut the Court ignored an
important consequence—the stifling effect on democratic experimentation of
establishing a constitutional right to abortion.”).
30. See, e.g., id. at 254 (discussing the potential outcomes of different
decisions by the Court in Roe).
31. See ROSEN, supra note 4, at 90–97 (discussing the effect of the Roe
decision on American politics, particularly with judicial nominations); Sunstein,
supra note 4, at 766 (“[Roe] may well have created the Moral Majority, helped
defeat the equal rights amendment, and undermined the women’s movement by
spurring opposition and demobilizing potential adherents.” (citation omitted)).
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rejected the idea of compromise out of hand.32 Sunstein asserts
that Roe helped to mobilize religious conservatives who
successfully defeated the ERA and undercut the women’s
movement.33 William Eskridge elaborates on the way in which
Roe empowered traditionalists in the pro-life movement who
resisted any change to women’s roles.34 In the view of Eskridge
and his colleague John Ferejohn, Roe’s reasoning moved pro-life
traditionalists to more extreme positions and embittered the
abortion battle.35
Beyond backlash arguments have influence outside the legal
academy. Beginning in the 1980s, leading pro-lifers have used
these arguments as a reason for overruling Roe.36 For example, in
1981, Dr. John Willke, a leading abortion opponent since the preRoe period, argued that Roe should be overruled because of its
impact on American politics: “[W]e live in a Nation that is totally
polarized on this issue,” he asserted.37 “Unlike other issues in the
body politic, there is no middle ground, there is no compromise.”38
Justice Antonin Scalia has made beyond backlash arguments
a part of American constitutional law. In Planned Parenthood of

32. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 4, at 100 (“The result is a polarizing gap
between the moderation of the country as a whole on abortion and the radical
opposition it continues to inspire among conservative legal elites.”).
33. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 4, at 766 (“[T]he decision may well have
created the Moral Majority, helped defeat the equal rights amendment, and
undermined the women’s movement by spurring opposition and demobilizing
potential adherents.” (citation omitted)).
34. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 3, at 520 (“[A]ny substantial success on
the part of the pro-choice movement would have triggered a strong
countermovement, for it would have altered important status entitlements and
gender roles.”).
35. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 242 (2010) (“Pro-life traditionalists
mobilized as a normative social movement seeking to preserve not only human
life but also a traditionalist ethic of family values and women’s domestic
role. . . . [T]he movement sought to amend the Constitution to overrule Roe.”).
36. See Confirmation of Sandra Day O’Connor to the Supreme Court:
Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong. 282 (Sept. 10, 1981)
(statement of Dr. John Willke, President, National Right to Life Committee)
(analogizing Roe to Dred Scott as an example of another case that exists as a
“blot upon our Nation”).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,39 the majority used post-Roe
backlash in explaining the need to hold fast to Roe’s “essential”
holding.40 Were the Court to hold otherwise, the Casey majority
suggested, the Justices would signal their vulnerability to
political pressure.41
Scalia responded that maintaining Roe, just like deciding it,
would make the abortion battle more dysfunctional.42 Scalia
explained:
Roe’s mandate for abortion on demand destroyed the
compromises of the past, rendered compromise
impossible for the future, and required the entire issue
to be resolved uniformly, at the national level . . . . Roe
fanned into life an issue that has inflamed our national
politics in general, and has obscured with its smoke the
selection of Justices to this Court in particular, ever
since. And by keeping us in the abortion-umpiring
business, it is the perpetuation of that disruption [. . .]
that the Court’s new majority decrees.43
In Scalia’s view, Roe created a politics of violence, radicalization,
and hostility to the Court.44 The opinion’s unconvincing, resultoriented reasoning angered a public that demanded principled
decision making.45 Furthermore, the Court’s imposition of a
single, national solution precluded any meaningful effort to find
consensus on the abortion issue.46 Only overruling Roe, Scalia
39. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
40. See id. at 867 (“So to overrule under fire in the absence of the most
compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s
legitimacy beyond any serious question.”).
41. See id. (“[T]o reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s
legitimacy beyond any serious question . . . [and] [t]he country’s loss of
confidence in the Judiciary would be underscored by an equally certain and
equally reasonable condemnation for another failing in overruling unnecessarily
and under pressure.”).
42. See id. at 997–1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing how the plurality
opinion’s “maintaining” of Roe is actually inconsistent with the principals of Roe
and arguing that the Supreme Court must get out of the debate because it has
no right to be there in the first place).
43. Id. at 996–97.
44. See id. (discussing the public and political reactions and effects of Roe).
45. See id. at 995–97 (discussing the problem with standing by Roe because
of the public opinion against it and noting that this Nietzchean vision of the
Court is not what the Founders envisioned).
46. See id. at 995 (“Roe’s mandate for abortion on demand destroyed the
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tells us, would offer any opportunity to create a more productive
dialogue about abortion.47
Beyond backlash arguments speak to courts as much as to
social movement members. These contentions ask courts to
consider the impact their decisions will have not just on a
particular cause but also on the larger geography of American
politics. Roe serves as a warning about the harm that courts can
do in exercising judicial review.48
As importantly, beyond backlash arguments offer a
compelling narrative about the world Roe produced. In this
account, opposing movements responded to Roe by taking more
extreme positions and became less flexible in their gender
politics.49 Possible partnerships on related issues, including
family planning, sex discrimination, and maternal rights, became
impossible.50
What features of Roe supposedly produced this stalemate?
Some scholars point to the decision’s timing. Michael McConnell
has described Roe as a decision “that cuts off deliberation and
debate, that makes compromise impossible, and that eliminates
political solutions.”51 William Eskridge and John Ferejohn
similarly describe Roe as an effort “to close off active democratic

compromises of the past, rendered compromise impossible for the future, and
required the entire issue to be resolved uniformly, at the national level.”).
47. See id. at 1002 (“[B]y banishing the issue from the political forum that
gives all participants, even the losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an
honest fight, by continuing the imposition of a rigid national rule instead of
allowing for regional differences, the Court merely prolongs and intensifies the
anguish.”).
48. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Constitutional
Horticulture: Deliberation-Respecting Judicial Review, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1273,
1293–94 (2009) (using Roe as an example of why judicial review should be
limited).
49. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 472–73 (discussing the
countermovements from Roe and the success of the pro-life and anti-ERA
movements); Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 572
(discussing the “polarization narrative”).
50. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 589 (discussing
the conventional “polarization narrative” of scholars, which suggests that after
Roe compromise on issues was impossible).
51. Michael McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming
Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1540 (1989) (reviewing MICHAEL
J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988)).
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deliberation through activist judicial review.”52 In 1985, Justice
Ginsburg pioneered such an argument about Roe’s timing.53
Before the opinion came down, Ginsburg asserts, the pro-choice
movement had made impressive progress in the states.54 Because
the Court decided too much too soon, the pro-life movement was
able to reverse this trend and introduce new abortion
restrictions.55 Because the public did not yet support the
expansive abortion rights Roe announced, the opinion
unnecessarily angered abortion opponents and radicalized
discussion of the issue.56
Others emphasize the sweeping holding and rationale Roe
offered. Cass Sunstein, whose minimalist theory urges an
incremental approach to judicial decision making, describes Roe
as “a large mistake.”57 Richard Posner’s judicial pragmatism also
appears incompatible with Roe’s far-reaching holding.58
Arguments about Roe’s consequences figure centrally in
conversations about the role played by the courts in American
democracy. Scholars use Roe as a case study of the unexpected
harms produced by judicial review.59 Some, like Sunstein and
52. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 48, at 1302.
53. See Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 381–84 (discussing the legislative
movements prior to the Roe decision and how Roe effected the change that was
occurring before the decision).
54. See id. at 379–80 (describing the movement towards liberalization of
abortion statutes across states and the Texas law at issue in Roe as “the most
extreme prohibition extant”).
55. See id. at 381 (“Roe ventured too far in the change it ordered. The
sweep and detail of the opinion stimulated the mobilization of a right-to-life
movement and an attendant reaction in Congress and state legislatures.”).
56. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 766 (“[T]he decision . . . spur[red]
opposition and demobilize[ed] potential adherents. . . . At the same time, Roe
may have taken national policy too abruptly to a point toward which it was
groping more slowly . . . .”).
57. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Minimalist Constitution, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 37–38 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009)
(“Minimalists want to avoid broad, ambitious judicial rulings.”).
58. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 257 (“But Roe v. Wade was not [an
easy interpretive case] and the decision is more realistically understood as a
reflection of the relative weight that seven Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court
placed on fetal life and women’s reproductive autonomy than as a consequence
of reading the Constitution carefully . . . .”).
59. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 3, at 520 (“Roe illustrates the central
problem with a philosophy that rejects pragmatic considerations in
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Posner, rely on Roe as an illustration of the relative
disadvantages
of
particular
modes
of
constitutional
interpretation.60 Even within the Court, Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg turn to Roe’s effects in reasoning about the best path
forward in American abortion law.61 In stories about the power of
the courts, Roe serves as a cautionary tale.62 Scholars urge judges
to consider this history before issuing decisions with damaging
consequences.63
Parts III and IV use original archival evidence to test the
beyond backlash hypothesis. A number of scholars have argued
that conflict over abortion began well before Roe, as activists
mobilized to change state laws. This Article breaks new ground
by showing that opportunities for compromise remained after the
decision. Part III examines one effort of this kind—an
antiabortion effort to create a new right of reproductive choice.
III. The Pro-Life Movement and Reproductive Freedom
In the mid-1970s, both pro-choice and pro-life activists
offered a capacious new understanding of reproductive freedom.64
constitutional jurisprudence . . . .”).
60. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 4, at 766 (discussing Roe as an
illustration of the Court’s limited efficacy in bringing about social change).
61. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 982–85
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Roe, the public reactions to Roe, and
how the Court should deal with those reactions in making decisions regarding
abortion law); Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 386 (“I understand the view that for
political reasons the reproductive autonomy controversy should be isolated from
the general debate on equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for
women and men. I expect . . . that organized and determined opposing efforts to
inform and persuade the public on the abortion issue will continue . . . .”).
62. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 995–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the
Casey opinion as an example that “[t]he Imperial Judiciary lives” and
questioning whether the Court was following its Constitutional duties by
continuing to stick with Roe).
63. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 16, at 2086
[T]he history of conflict before and after Roe suggests that in thinking
about the possibilities and limits of adjudication, we need to be
attentive to the motives for conflict that emerge from sources outside
as well as inside the courtroom, from directions and actors that may
shift over time.
64. See SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION
AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT 61–62 (1991) (describing the post-Roe
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Although they disagreed profoundly about abortion and the
nature of motherhood, opposing activists believed that
reproductive choice lost meaning if women did not have the
financial means to raise children without sacrificing their
careers, educations, or health.65 Many feminists argued that
reproductive choice required access to and funding for abortion,66
whereas most abortion opponents favored an amendment that
would ban abortions performed by private as well as state
actors.67 While pro-lifers often saw motherhood as women’s
natural role, feminists wished to separate women’s reproductive
capacities and social obligations.68 Nonetheless, those on opposing
sides of the abortion issue collaborated successfully in
campaigning for protections for adolescent mothers and bans on
emergence of “multi-issue organizations” that fought for a broad variety
women’s issues); Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 582
(discussing the new position of American Citizens Concerned for Life (ACCL)
that protection and economic equality of pregnant women was important to
prevent abortion).
65. See STAGGENBORG, supra note 64, at 113 (“The Reproductive Rights
National Network . . . demand[ed] not only the right to legal abortion, but also
the right to child care, health care, an adequate income, and other conditions
that would allow women a real choice as to whether or not to have
children . . . .”); Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 575 (“[T]he
Mecklenburg faction supported or at least accepted broad access to family
planning services, as well as publicly funded daycare.”).
66. For discussion of feminist interest in abortion funding, see, for example,
SERENE MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 191 (2011) (discussing the “battle over abortion funding” and its
linking of feminists and civil rights advocates because “[w]hen poor women did
seek abortion, lack of funds more than legal restrictions stood in their way”);
JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS MOVEMENT
82 (2003) (“Mary Treadwell echoed Gray’s notion of reproductive freedom when
she insisted that feminists needed to take into account the economic needs of
poor women of color when they spoke of abortion rights.”).
67. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND
LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 209–10 (1992) (“[Pro-life
groups] also, at least initially, concurred on the single best vehicle for achieving
that goal—an amendment to the U.S. Constitution.”). On the campaign for fetalrights amendment in the early 1970s, see, for example, STAGGENBORG, supra
note 64, at 69, 71, 106–07.
68. See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the
Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 450–55
(2011) (discussing the Citizen’s Advisory Council on the Status of Women and
feminists’ attempt to seek temporary disability for pregnant women by arguing
that while child gestation can only be done by women, both men and women can
perform childrearing).
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pregnancy discrimination.69 These activists agreed that true
choice would require state assistance.70
A. Trauma, Abortion, and Unintended Pregnancy
Pro-life arguments about reproductive choice emerged from
earlier dialogue about the impact of abortion on women’s mental
health.71 Beginning in the mid-1960s, a handful of states
reformed their abortion laws to make the procedure legal on the
basis of mental health, among other reasons.72 Looking to the
model statute adopted by the American Law Institute (ALI),
these reform states also permitted abortion on a variety of
grounds.73 Nonetheless, as the number of abortions performed
annually increased, psychiatric abortions became the most
accessible.74 Women infrequently reported cases of rape, incest,
69. See id. at 471 n.346 (“The specter of abortion, however, led some social
conservatives to support the [Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)] as a new
form of state protection for motherhood.”); Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise,
supra note 28, at 582 (“[T]he [ACCL] positioned itself as a reasonable
antiabortion organization with which a variety of abortion advocacy groups
could work.”).
70. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 582 (discussing
the ACCL’s efforts against Gilbert that aligned with those of a feminist, prochoice coalition).
71. See Thomas W. Hilgers, The Medical Hazards of Legally Induced
Abortion, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 57, 75–77
(discussing the psychiatric problems women encounter after an abortion); Fred
E. Mecklenburg, The Indications for Induced Abortion: A Physician’s
Perspective, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 37, 39–41
(discussing the impact of abortion versus birth on the mother).
72. See, e.g., KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD
65 (1984) (“In 1959, the American Law Institute had proposed a Model Penal
Code that would have written into the abortion law the considerations some
doctors were already using: the mental health of the mother, rape or incest, and
fetal deformity.”); LESLIE REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN,
MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1973, at 220–21 (1997) (“[The
model law] allowed licensed physicians to perform abortions for physical and
mental health reasons, fetal defects, or when pregnancy was the result of rape
or incest.” (footnote omitted)).
73. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 16, at 2037–38 (discussing the
model statute and the effect that it had on state laws).
74. See Christopher Tietze, United States: Therapeutic Abortions, 1963 to
1968, STUDIES IN FAM. PLAN., Nov. 1970, at 5, 5 (showing that between 1963 and
1968, total abortions increased from 390 to 4,626 and psychiatric abortions
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and fetal abnormality, and with improvements to obstetric and
gynecological care, fewer physicians could fit abortions within
physical-health exceptions.75 Between 1963 and 1968, a published
study reported a seven-fold increase in the number of psychiatric
abortions performed.76
To avoid legal liability, physicians had to fit a variety of
social and economic decisions into the category of psychiatric
abortions.77 In 1970, Studies in Family Planning found that a
majority of psychiatric abortions were not “strictly psychiatric”
but rather justified on the basis of “impulsive behavior,
misjudgment, [and] environmental factors like alcoholism, drug
use, and some types of adolescent behavior.”78 In diagnosing a
woman as depressed or suicidal, as other studies reported,
physicians took into account a woman’s socioeconomic or marital
status.79
Providers justified a wide variety of abortions—including
those chosen for social or economic reasons—on psychiatric
grounds.80 By extension, the emerging pro-choice movement
suggested that legal abortion would prevent a great deal of
psychological trauma.81 In a strategy memorandum to pro-choice
increased from 44.6% of abortions to 69.6%).
75. See, e.g., LUKER, supra note 72, at 54 (“Between the two world wars,
medical science made large strides in eliminating or discovering new treatments
for conditions that had previously threatened maternal health.”).
76. See Tietze, supra note 74, at 5 (showing that in 1963, 174 psychiatric
abortions were performed compared to 3,219 in 1968).
77. See Sidney H. Norman et al., Abortion: Obtained and Denied, STUD. IN
FAM. PLAN., May 1970, at 1, 4 (discussing the fact that women would enter a
psychiatric evaluation with the goal of obtaining an abortion and “[t]he most
important consideration in the psychiatrist’s mind . . . is the total effect on the
woman and her family of carrying the pregnancy to term”).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., John A. Ewing & Beatrice A. Rouse, Therapeutic Abortion and
a Prior Psychiatric History, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 37, 38 (1973) (“The study
group consisted of black and white women from all socioeconomic levels.”); John
R. Partridge et al., A Study of Psychiatric Applicants at North Carolina Medical
Hospital, 32 N.C. MED. J. 131, 132–36 (1971) (discussing the demographic
information that the study collected).
80. See Norman, supra note 77, at 4 (“The majority of abortions performed
on psychiatric recommendation . . . do not appear to be ‘strictly psychiatric’ . . . .
The symptoms presented by patients usually consist of a variety of personality
disorders . . . interacting with environmental problems . . . .”).
81. See Siegel, supra note 20, at 1653 n.44 (discussing “a substantial body
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activists, leading advocate Larry Lader wrote: “Cite cases of how
women’s lives were ruined by being forced to bear an unwanted
child . . . [and] the tragedy of the unwanted child, possibly leading
to the battered child and infanticide.”82 Similarly, the official
debate manual of the National Association for the Repeal of
Abortion Laws (NARAL, later known as the National Abortion
Rights Action League) described the psychological harms averted
by legal abortion.83 Liberalizing archaic laws would “decrease the
number of unwanted children, battered children, child abuse
cases, and possibly subsequent delinquency, drug addiction, and
a host of social ills associated with neglectful parenthood.”84 The
manual also counseled activists on how to respond to allegations
that abortion would psychologically damage women.85 The
response was: “While many women are known to be hospitalized
with mental illness following childbirth, such severe psychosis
following abortion is virtually unknown.”86
Beginning in the 1960s, scholars opposed to abortion
responded by arguing that abortion caused psychiatric distress.
Legal scholar Dennis Mahoney explained: “[T]herapeutic
abortion . . . carries with it a degree of emotional trauma far
exceeding that which would have been sustained by continuation
of the pregnancy.”87 Another scholar went further in outlining the
damage done by abortion: “Social reasons can never be held
sufficient to warrant the dangers of emotional trauma that . . .
[women] will subsequently experience. ‘[Abortion] cannot be to
of scholarship that repudiates claims of post-abortion syndrome”).
82. Memorandum from Larry Lader, Chairman of the Bd. Nat’l Ass’n for
Repeal of Abortion Laws (NARAL), to NARAL Bd. Members et al. 2 (Fall 1972)
(on file with the Schlesinger Library, Harvard University, The NARAL Papers,
MC 313, Carton 8, Folder “Debating the Opposition”).
83. See id. at 5 (“Women undergoing the degradation, danger, and expense
of a clandestine abortion are quite likely to experience negative after-effects, but
this is not true in situations where abortion is legally sanctioned and widely
accepted.”).
84. Id.
85. See id. (outlining what to say when abortion opponents argue that
“[w]omen undergoing abortions suffer severe and lasting psychological
sequelae”).
86. Id.
87. Dennis Mahoney, Therapeutic Abortions—The Psychiatric Indication—
A Double-Edged Sword, 72 DICK. L. REV. 270, 288–89 (1968).
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prevent mental illness, for abortion is not a prophylactic against
psychosis, but rather a precipitant.’”88
When the American Medical Association debated abortion
reform in 1967, one antiabortion physician contended that “all
clinical experience shows that abortion is a mental wound as well
as a physical wound.”89
Roe borrowed significantly from discussion of the
relationship between pregnancy and trauma in explaining the
constitutional significance of the abortion decision. In explaining
why women had a privacy interest in abortion, the Court stressed
the psychological impact unintended pregnancy and childbirth
had on women:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific
and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring,
may force upon the woman a distressful life and future.
Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical
health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress,
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already
unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other
cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing
stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.90

Pregnancy signaled mental problems and “a distressful life and
future.”91 Women, whom the Court assumed to be caretakers,
would have their mental health taxed by childcare, as would
unwanted children.92 These harms followed inevitably from a
woman’s sexual decisions.93 Women became victims of their own
choices, suffering on account of the “continuing stigma of unwed

88. John G. Herbert, Is Legalized Abortion the Solution to Criminal
Abortion?, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 291, 291 (1964) (citation omitted).
89. Martin Tolchin, Doctors Divided on Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1967, at
23.
90. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
91. Id.
92. See id. (“Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.”).
93. See id. at 147, 153 (discussing how Texas’s purpose for the abortion
statute was “to discourage illicit sexual conduct” and describing the harms that
flow from an unwanted pregnancy).
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motherhood” and the “[p]sychological harm” associated with
unwed motherhood.94
B. Vulnerable Mothers and Reproductive Choice
Because Roe foregrounded the question of mental illness, the
opinion reinforced social-movement interest in debating the
relationship between trauma, pregnancy, and abortion. In the
aftermath of the decision, a circle of moderate pro-life activists
offered a new legal argument about post-abortion trauma.95
Central to this effort were members of American Citizens
Concerned for Life (ACCL), a group the National Organization for
Women (NOW) described as a pro-life, “pro-birth control, pro-sex
education” organization.96 Marjory Mecklenburg, one of the
organization’s leaders, helped to formulate a theory addressing
the relationship between trauma, motherhood, and abortion.97
Mecklenburg became better known for her later role supervising
federal family planning programs under the Reagan
Administration,98 but her role in the abortion debate was far
more complex. A former home economics teacher, Mecklenburg
became one of the most powerful women in pro-life politics,
serving as the chairwoman of the nation’s largest national
antiabortion organization, advising Gerald Ford’s presidential
campaign, and influencing national debate on a variety of gender
issues.99
94. Id.
95. See Siegel, supra note 20, at 1658 (“In this therapeutic form, postabortion syndrome was embraced by women in the antiabortion
movement . . . .”).
96. NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, MAJOR NATIONAL GROUPS OPPOSED TO THE
RIGHT TO CHOOSE 2 (1978) (on file with the Schlesinger Library, Harvard
University, The NOW Papers, Box 54, Folder 42).
97. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 575–77
(discussing the impact that Marjory Mecklenburg had in shaping the National
Right to Life Committee).
98. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA M. LORD, CONDOM NATION: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT’S SEX EDUCATION PROGRAM FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE INTERNET
143–44 (2010) (discussing Reagan’s nominations of Koop and Mecklenburg).
99. See, e.g., Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at, 572–80
(discussing Mecklenburg’s influence and career particularly with the National
Right to Life Committee and American Citizens Concerned for Life); Mary
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Mecklenburg’s ACCL argued that both abortion and
unintended pregnancy created psychiatric distress.100 Partly for
this reason, the organization supported mainstream pro-life
initiatives, including a constitutional amendment that would
prohibit private and public actors from performing abortions.101
However, these activists argued that the state could fairly ban
abortion only if it provided far-reaching rights for pregnant
women, mothers, and postnatal children.102
Over time, these moderate activists formulated a new
understanding of the right to choose. While not acknowledging
any constitutional protections for abortion, these advocates
insisted that reproductive choice required both financial and
symbolic support for childbirth and childrearing.103
The ACCL first used this understanding of reproductive
choice during the campaign for a fetal-rights amendment in the
mid-1970s.104 Members of Congress had two constitutional
amendments under consideration.105 The Buckley Amendment,
proposed by Senator James Buckley (Conservative-NY), stated:
Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern ProLife Feminism, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 232, 242 (2013) [hereinafter
Ziegler, Rights on the Right] (discussing Mecklenburg’s campaigning for and
testifying on behalf of the so-called Adolescent Health Services and Pregnancy
Prevention Act of 1978).
100. See Abortion—Part IV: Hearings on S.J. Res. 6, S.J. Res. 10 & 11, &
S.J. Res. 91 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S.
Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong. 655 (June 19, 1975) (statement of Marjory
Mecklenburg, President, American Citizens Concerned for Life) [hereinafter
Abortion Hearings] (“During the early months of pregnancy, it is not uncommon
for any woman to react with fear, resentment, and depression.”).
101. See, e.g., id. at 653–54 (arguing in support of the Human Life
Amendment).
102. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 578–79 (“[T]he
organization’s philosophy held that fetal rights could be protected only if women
were themselves guaranteed better legal and economic opportunities.”).
103. See id. at 575 (“[M]embers of the Mecklenburg faction supported or at
least accepted broad access to family planning services, as well as publiclyfunded daycare.” (citation omitted)).
104. See id. at 578–79 (“[T]he organization’s philosophy held that fetal rights
could be protected only if women were themselves guaranteed better legal and
economic opportunities.”).
105. See Human Life Amendment: Major Texts (Nat’l Comm. for a Human
Life Amendment, Washington, D.C.) Feb. 2004, at 1, 3, http://www.nchla.org/
datasource/idocuments/HLAmajortexts.pdf
(describing
the
Amendments
introduced by Senator Buckley and Representative Hogan).
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“With respect to the right to life, the word ‘person’ . . . applies to
all human beings, including their unborn offspring at every state
of their biological development.”106 Representative Larry Hogan
(R-Md.) offered an amendment describing: “Neither the United
States nor any State shall deprive any human being, from the
moment of conception, of life without due process of law.”107
While endorsing such far-reaching bans on abortion,
Mecklenburg focused on what the state owed mothers: “We need
to ask what are the conditions of life which confront women who
are troubled by an unintended pregnancy but who do not choose
abortion. What are their rights? What is society’s duty to them
and to the children they will bear?”108
Mecklenburg formulated a new understanding of
reproductive choice. The Supreme Court had set forth an idea of
choice that mostly involved liberty from the state.109 Mecklenburg
instead saw choice as inextricably linked to the idea of welfare
rights.110 If the state recognized a right to choose to bear a child,
as Mecklenburg argued, then the state had to guarantee women
the means to raise that child.111 She asked Congress to support
child care, sex education, family planning, and programs to
encourage young girls to continue to pursue education in the
setting of their choice.112
In the same period, reproductive-rights activists in
organizations like the Reproductive Rights National Network
(R2N2) and the Committee for Abortion Rights and Against
Sterilization Abuse (CARASA) connected state support and

106. Id. at 1.
107. Id. at 3.
108. Abortion Hearings, supra note 100, at 654.
109. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy,
whether it be found in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty
and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, . . . in the Ninth
Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people . . . .”).
110. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 579 (“[T]he
only way to protect fetal rights was to [provide] . . . . ‘more medical assistance
for the unwed mother and her baby, programs to keep pregnant girls in school
and . . . provid[e] for daycare centers and . . . . prevent pregnancy.’” (quoting
Abortion Hearings, supra note 100, at 643–53)).
111. Abortion Hearings, supra note 100, at 584–87.
112. Id. at 585–87.
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reproductive freedom.113 These groups formed to offer a more
radical alternative to the pro-choice movement—one that would
fight for a more transformative agenda.114 In the late 1970s,
CARASA, a New York-based reproductive-rights organization,
described reproductive choice as the “[r]ight to decide when and
whether to have/not have children; and [the] material possibility
of making that choice.”115 For that choice to have meaning,
CARASA argued, women needed access to birth control, child
care, decent health care, and a decent income.116 In 1980, R2N2
argued that reproductive freedom required that the state do more
than leave women alone.117 True freedom required “a multi-issue
approach to abortion . . . capable of fighting for all the economic
and social conditions necessary for true reproductive freedom.”118
Mecklenburg and the ACCL took a strongly different position
on abortion.119 Just the same, some moderate pro-life activists
and feminists agreed in significant part about the meaning of a
right to choose.120 Mecklenburg believed that the state had an
obligation to protect and honor mothers—both by banning
abortion and by providing concrete support for caretaking.121
113. See Defend Women’s Right to Choose, Draft Outline for CARASA (c.
1978) (discussing where the opposition was coming from and highlighting state
politicians as someone to target) (on file with Bingham Library, Duke
University, The Meredith Tax Papers).
114. See id. (discussing “reproductive freedom,” which included a broader
agenda than just protecting the right to abortion).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., id. (listing the “‘preconditions’ of free choice”).
117. See Marge Berer, Whatever Happened to ‘A Woman’s Right to Choose’?,
FEMINIST REV., Summer 1988, at 24, 24 (“The phrase ‘women’s reproductive
rights’ . . . . was first coined in the USA by feminists who formed the
campaigning Reproductive Rights National Network. The concept . . . links up
all different aspects of birth control and childbearing . . . .”).
118. WENDY KLINE, BODIES OF KNOWLEDGE: SEXUALITY, REPRODUCTION, AND
WOMEN’S HEALTH IN THE SECOND WAVE 93 (2010).
119. See Hilgers, Mecklenburg & Riordan, supra note 14, at 178–79 (arguing
that when abortion proponents argue that abortion is necessary to rid unwanted
children, they are “really advocating the abandonment of women”).
120. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 574 (“A wide
variety of antiabortion leaders held liberal or moderate views on some social
issues. For example, . . . endorsement of sex education in public schools.”).
121. See id. at 579 (“Mecklenburg laid out one vision of the moderates’
philosophy: the only way to protect fetal rights was to ‘work harder than ever to
make abortion unnecessary.’”).
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Some feminists agreed that real choice required social justice as
well as liberty.122
Mecklenburg elaborated on this idea during the fight for the
School-Age Mother and Child Health Act of 1975,123 a
comprehensive program that would have set aside funding for
pregnancy testing, comprehensive healthcare for newborns and
toddlers, family planning, day care, continuing education, and
adoption assistance.124 Pro-choice activists endorsed the reform,
as did the ACCL.125 In testifying in favor of the bill, Mecklenburg
elaborated on her idea of reproductive choice: “[M]any poor
women, pressed by financial circumstances presently have only
the ‘freedom’ to abort . . . . Surely, advocacy of the ‘right of a
woman to choose’ does include the right for her to choose to
continue the pregnancy.”126
The School-Age Mother and Child Act of 1975 failed to
pass,127 but the ACCL revived its campaign for reproductive
choice in lobbying for the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA).128 Feminists viewed pregnancy disability reform quite
differently than did Mecklenburg’s allies, presenting it as part of
a larger project to separate women’s biological and social roles.129
Those involved in the temporary disability struggle worked “to
122. See id. at 572 (“[P]ost-Roe compromise in the 1970s was more possible
than is conventionally thought, especially on issues beyond abortion itself . . .
[A]ntiabortion moderates campaigned for what they defined to be alternatives to
abortion . . . .”).
123. National School-Age Mother and Child Health Act, H.R. 10589, 94th
Cong. (1975).
124. See National School-Age Mother and Child Health Act of 1975: Hearing
on S. 2538 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Sen. Comm. of Labor & Pub.
Welfare, 94th Cong. 10–12 (1975) (outlining the proposed bill).
125. See, e.g., id. at 552–81 (statement of Jack Hood Vaughn of Planned
Parenthood) (supporting the Act).
126. Id. at 499 (statement of Marjory Mecklenburg).
127. See, e.g., KRISTIN LUKER, DUBIOUS CONCEPTION: THE POLITICS OF
TEENAGE PREGNANCY 71 (1996) (discussing the Act).
128. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); see also
Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 572 (stating that the ACCL
“campaigned for what they defined as alternatives to abortion: for example, laws
prohibiting pregnancy discrimination”).
129. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 68, at 450–51 (discussing the Citizens’
Advisory Council on the Status of Women’s advocacy for pregnancy to fit into
the “pre-existing sex-neutral . . . . temporary disability paradigm”).
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realize economic security for childbearing workers, without
reinforcing sex-role stereotypes.”130 Significantly, leading
feminists often opposed any special protection for mothers.131
Describing pregnancy discrimination in this manner presented it
as part of a larger effort to end women’s subordination in the
family and the larger society.132
In seeking to free women from sex stereotypes, feminists also
presented publicly funded, universal day care as a fundamental
right.133 By the early 1970s, feminists made some progress in the
quest to secure this right, when the Comprehensive Child
Development Act of 1971134 garnered significant support.135 The
ultimately unsuccessful law would have offered affordable child
care services to families across the socioeconomic spectrum.136
Moderate pro-lifers supported both protections against
pregnancy discrimination and federally mandated childcare
programs, albeit for different reasons.137 The ACCL took up the
issue of pregnancy discrimination after 1976, when the Supreme
Court concluded that pregnancy discrimination did not constitute
impermissible sex discrimination under the federal Civil Rights
130. Id. at 454.
131. See id. at 454–55 (discussing arguments of leading feminists).
132. See id. (“In advocating for distinct legal paradigms addressing the
biological and social dimensions of reproduction, feminists aspired to unravel
women’s capacity for pregnancy from the prescription of normative gender
roles.”).
133. See, e.g., id. at 457–60 (discussing feminists’ arguments for childcare
and their desire to “transform the family-wage system” as well as its political
implications); Mary Ziegler, The Bonds That Tie: The Politics of Motherhood and
the Future of Abortion Rights, 21 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 47, 54–55 (2011)
[hereinafter Ziegler, The Bonds That Tie] (discussing the 1970 White House
Conference on Youth and Children and its arguments for publicly funded day
care).
134. Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971, 92 H.R. 6748, 92nd
Cong.
135. See, e.g., Ziegler, The Bonds That Tie, supra note 133, at 54–57
(discussing NOW’s emphasis on child development in advocating for day care).
On the Act, see, for example, Dinner, supra note 68, at 461.
136. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 68, at 461 (discussing why the
Comprehensive Child Development Act was unsuccessful).
137. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 589–90
(discussing the compromise available after Roe because some pro-lifers, like
Marjory Mecklenburg, supported state-funded support for alternatives to
abortion).
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Act.138 In the 1973 Supreme Court case Geduldig v. Aiello,139 the
Court upheld a California disability policy that excluded
pregnancy, concluding that such laws did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.140 Several years later, in General Electric v.
Gilbert,141 the Supreme Court concluded that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 provided no relief.142 In the wake of Gilbert, a
coalition of feminist and labor activists vowed to pass a law
changing the result of the Court’s decision.143
Feminist advocacy for the PDA spoke “to sex equality, to
women’s socioeconomic independence, and to the eradication of
sex-role stereotypes.”144 By contrast, in lobbying for the PDA, the
ACCL elaborated on the connection between sex discrimination
and reproductive choice:
[Pregnancy discrimination] has a severe impact upon lowincome workers who are forced to take unpaid maternity leave
at precisely the time when expenses are increased . . . .
When a wom[a]n is faced with losing her income for several
weeks or months and perhaps with losing her job because of
pregnancy, her decision to abort cannot be said to be the
product of free choice of economic coercion.145
138. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145–46 (1976) (holding that
General Electric’s disability-benefits plan did not violate Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 because of its failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities);
Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 581 (“The ACCL’s influence
was also apparent in the public response to the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision
in General Electric Company v. Gilbert.”).
139. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
140. See id. at 497 (“The appellee simply contends that, although she has
received insurance protection equivalent to that provided all other participating
employees, she has suffered discrimination because she encountered a risk that
was outside the program’s protection. . . . [W]e hold that this contention is not a
valid one under the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”).
141. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
142. See id. at 145–46 (“[I]ts disability-benefits plan does not violate Title
VII because of its failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities.”).
143. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 68, at 469–70 (“A coalition of labor,
feminists, and civil rights groups, along with sympathetic congressional staff,
mobilized in support of federal legislation to amend Title VII, which would
override Gilbert . . . .”).
144. Id. at 470.
145. Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977: Hearings on S. 995
Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the Comm. on Human Res., 95th
Cong. 432 (1977) (statement of Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Special Counsel,
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In advocating its own idea of reproductive choice, the ACCL
ultimately joined feminists in supporting a version of the PDA
that would require employers to fund leave after an abortion.146
Abortion opponents in Congress, including Senator Thomas
Eagleton (D-Mo.) and Representative Edward Beard (D-R.I.), had
sought to amend the PDA to ensure that employers would not
have to support employees receiving post-abortion care.147 The
ACCL publicly endorsed the bill with or without such an
exception.148 As ACCL member Dorothy Czarnecki explained: “I
think a woman should be given her choice. This bill is good
because it encourages people to remain pregnant rather than
coerces them to abortion, but this [decision] would [depend on] a
woman’s feelings. It is a matter of a woman’s choice that we
would be allowing.”149
If the Constitution truly protected a right to reproductive
freedom, as the ACCL argued, that right included government
assistance with the reproductive decisions women made.150 This
American Citizens Concerned for Life) [hereinafter Pregnancy Discrimination
Hearings].
146. See, e.g., Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of
Pregnancy Part 2: Hearing on H.R. 5055 & H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. of
Emp’t Opportunities of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 95th Cong. 67 (1977)
(statement of Dr. Dorothy Czarnecki, American Citizens Concerned for Life)
[hereinafter Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination] (testifying that by
providing equal disability coverage for women who receive an abortion or go
through with the pregnancy, a woman’s choice is preserved).
147. See, e.g., Martin Tolchin, House Panel Bars Curb on Abortions in
Women’s Aid Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1978, at A11 (reporting on the Beard
Amendment proposed to antiabortion legislation); Senate Votes Pregnancy
Benefits in Disability Plans for Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1977, at A8
(reporting on a bill to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and a proposed
amendment by Senator Eagleton “that would have prohibited abortions from
being considered a pregnancy-related medical expense that could be covered by”
disability benefits).
148. See Pregnancy Discrimination Hearings, supra note 145, at 435
(statement of Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Special Counsel, American Citizens
Concerned for Life) (“I will discuss ACCL’s interest in this amendment and why
the amendment is essential to secure protection and economic equality for
pregnant women.”).
149. Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination, supra note 146, at 67
(statement of Dr. Dorothy Czarnecki).
150. See id. at 67–68 (arguing that government protection and financial
assistance with the repercussions of pregnancy was necessary to ensure that
women truly did have a right to choose regarding their reproductive freedom).
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claim united pro-choice and pro-life activists dissatisfied with the
Court’s reasoning in both Roe v. Wade and Maher v. Roe.151 Roe
described a right to privacy broad enough to encompass decisions
about abortion and contraception.152 Maher, a case on the
constitutionality of state bans on the public funding of abortion,
clarified that this right involved only a freedom from state
interference rather than any entitlement to state support.153 For
influential activists on either side of the abortion issue, the
freedom to choose had to include government support for
caretaking.154
Mecklenburg and the ACCL also demanded accommodations,
rather than mere equal treatment, for unwed mothers.155 The
group lobbied consistently for a “comprehensive approach . . .
[that would] provid[e] both medical care and psycho–social
support.”156 Eliminating discrimination against unwed mothers
would require the creation of government programs ensuring
access to healthcare, education, and employment.
Key sponsors of the PDA echoed this idea of reproductive
choice. Pro-life Senators like Thomas Eagleton argued that sex
discrimination could effectively coerce women into terminating a
pregnancy.157 Representative Ronald Sarasin (R-Conn.) similarly
151. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
152. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (discussing the line of
decisions establishing a right to privacy).
153. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74 (“[T]he right protects the woman from
unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to
terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the authority of a State to
make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that
judgment by the allocation of public funds.”).
154. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 590 (“Because
of the impact of these activists, important compromises remained viable in the
years immediately after Roe, solutions involving contraception, daycare, or
pregnancy discrimination rather than abortion itself.”).
155. See Abortion Hearings, supra note 100, at 655–66 (statement of Marjory
Mecklenburg) (arguing that unwed mothers need state assistance with things
such as education and practical skills and training).
156. Adolescent Pregnancy: Hearing on H.R. 12146 Before the Subcomm. on
Select Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 95th Cong. 110 (1978)
(statement of Marjory Mecklenburg).
157. See Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978: S.
Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 96th Cong. 116 (1980) (statement of Senator
Thomas Eagleton) [hereinafter Legislative History] (arguing that the PDA would
rectify situations “where the price tag of a baby determines whether it is born or
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argued that reproductive choice could not require a woman to
sacrifice her career.158 In the past, Sarasin suggested, women had
to choose “between having children and working.”159 The PDA
gave a woman “the right to choose both, to be financially and
legally protected before, during, and after her pregnancy.”160 The
legislative history of the PDA suggested that the law would
“facilitate a woman’s choice to conceive and bear children without
facing undue economic hardships.”161
Conventionally, scholars believe that Roe short-circuited the
kind of partnership the ACCL successfully pursued.162 The PDA
represented a successful post-Roe collaboration between abortion
opponents and pro-choice activists. The version of the bill
endorsed by the ACCL—one without a ban on abortion funding—
garnered the support of NARAL and NOW.163 Similarly, the
ACCL partnered with Planned Parenthood in lobbying for the
Adolescent Health Services and Pregnancy Prevention and Care
Act, a law funding family planning, sex education, and child care
for teenagers.164
What can the ACCL’s campaign for reproductive choice tell
us about post-Roe ideological entrenchment? First, the ACCL’s
story shows that post-Roe politics created some incentive for
compromise. Internal documents from the late 1970s suggest that
ACCL members believed that pro-lifers could not be truly credible
not”); see also id. at 185 (Statement of Paul Tsongas) (arguing that the PDA
would “put an end to an unrealistic and unfair system that forces women to
choose between family and career”).
158. See id. at 208 (statement of Rep. Ronald Sarasin, Conn.) (“[I]t is a
statement of the importance this country places on the family, of the fact that
we must recognize the right of women to have families and to work.”).
159. Id. at 208–09 (statement of Rep. Ronald Sarasin).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 134 (statement of Rep. Baltasar Corrada).
162. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 589 (“Roe v.
Wade is seen to have marginalized moderates on either side of the abortion
debate and, in so doing, to have undone the kinds of state-level compromise that
had been unfolding at the state level.”).
163. See Legislative History, supra note 157, at 20 (listing organizations
supporting the bill).
164. See Adolescent Health Services and Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act
of 1978: Hearing on H.R. 12146 Before the S. Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong.
192–202 (1978) (statement of Faye Wattleton, Planned Parenthood Fed’n of
Am.) (urging Congress to adopt the law).
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or influential unless they worked with the opposition to make
abortion less necessary.165 In order to be taken seriously, the
argument went, pro-lifers had to be consistently concerned about
vulnerable members of society, including pregnant women.166
Second,
the
ACCL’s
experiences
complicate
our
understanding of post-Roe extremism. At first, it seems to make
sense to connect Roe to the radicalization of all gender politics. By
putting off limits many state compromises on abortion, Roe
removed any reason for pro-lifers to settle for second-best
solutions. As the ACCL’s story makes apparent, however, some
activists believed that absolutist positions on abortion required
compromise on other gender issues.167 Seeking out common
ground in this way would reduce the need for abortion and
strengthen society’s commitment to mothers’ rights.
Later, as Part IV contends, it became more challenging to
form alliances of this kind.168 The radicalization we blame solely
on Roe occurred gradually. Polarization, moreover, took place
partly without the influence of the Court. Moreover, as Part III
shows, pro-choice as well as pro-life activists responded to Roe by
working to find shared legal solutions.
IV. Fetal Rights Beyond Abortion
In Roe v. Wade, pro-choice amicus curiae briefs argued that,
in any conflict between women’s rights and fetal rights, the
woman’s interest in autonomy should prevail.169 After 1973,
165. See, e.g., AM. CITIZENS CONCERNED FOR LIFE, PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES
ACCL 1 (1974) (explaining ACCL’s goal to “maximize the potential for
cooperation in legislative and educational programs between ACCL and other
citizens action groups where overlap of some concerns may occur/coalition
building”) (on file with Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan,
Box 17, The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Folder “ACCL
Philosophy and Objectives”).
166. See id. (enumerating the goal of encouraging “a sense of responsibility
for . . . pregnant women”).
167. See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text (describing the ACCL’s
support for child care, sex education, and family planning).
168. See infra Part IV (arguing that these alliances became more difficult
after the emergence of the New Right).
169. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief for Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. and
Am. Ass’n of Planned Parenthood Physicians as Amici Curiae Supporting
OF
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members of the abortion-rights movement had to consider
whether support for legal abortion precluded any recognition of
fetal rights.170
Pro-choice activists debated these questions in the wake of
legal struggles over fetal research. In contemporary politics,
organizations like NOW consistently oppose most regulations on
fetal research, suggesting that restrictions tend to curb medical
progress and endanger abortion rights.171 In the immediate
aftermath of Roe, by contrast, the relationship between abortion
and fetal research—and even fetal rights—appeared far more
fluid.172 Members of Congress and some organizations supportive
of abortion rights endorsed limited protections for fetuses that did
not conflict with a woman’s abortion decision.173 Pro-choice
activists debated the propriety of fetal rights in the context of
scientific experimentation and late-term abortion.174
Only gradually did pro-choice support for fetal rights come to
seem a contradiction in terms. Again, the Court did not serve as
the primary source of polarization.175 Instead, as the pro-life
Petitioners at 19, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40) (“There
is no constitutional right or compelling state interest in the fetus which can
render constitutional the violation of women’s physicians’ rights . . . .”); Brief for
Orgs. and Named Women as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20–21, Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40) (“[E]ven if the position were
accepted . . . that the fetus is a ‘person’ or ‘potential person,’ such recognition of
the fetus would not provide the state with a compelling interest to justify
encroachment upon the pregnant woman’s possession and free control of her
own person.”).
170. Infra Parts IV.A–B.
171. See, e.g., Bush Once Again Sacrifices Science to Politics, NOW.ORG (Jul.
18, 2006), http://www.now.org/issues/health/071806stemcellresearch.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2014) (describing the President’s likely veto against a stem-cellresearch bill) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); NOW
Legislative Updates 2001, NOW.ORG (Feb. 2001), http://www.now.org/issues/
legislat/200102.html#stem (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (describing how President
Bush immediately began a pro-life agenda) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
172. See infra notes 177–93 and accompanying text (describing fetal
research hearings).
173. See infra notes 178–84 and accompanying text (discussing Senator
Edward Kennedy’s deliberation about fetal rights).
174. See infra notes 194–96 and accompanying text (deciding fetal rights do
exist, but the fetus does not have any priority over the mother).
175. See ROSENBERG, supra note 25, at 166 (asserting courts do not provide a
great deal of social change).

BEYOND BACKLASH

999

movement scored a string of victories in state legislatures,
supporters of abortion rights began to reject any law that could
set a precedent for recognizing fetal personhood.176 For their part,
abortion opponents often began to include laws on fetal research
or “born alive” fetuses in multipart laws restricting abortion. For
reasons having little to do with Roe, fetal rights seemed nothing
more than an excuse for banning abortion.
A. Fetal Research and Vulnerable Human Subjects
In July 1973, several members of the National Institutes of
Health urged the recognition of “human rights” for the aborted
fetus, particularly in the context of fetal research.177 Surprisingly,
the lawmaker at the center of a campaign for fetal rights, Senator
Edward Kennedy (D-MA), led the effort to protect abortion rights
in Congress. Before Roe, Kennedy, a devout Catholic, had come
out against the complete repeal of abortion restrictions.178
NARAL had singled him out for criticism.179 By 1974, however,
Kennedy became one of the pro-choice movement’s strongest
allies. He helped to engineer the defeat of the Bartlett
Amendment, a failed ban on Medicaid funding for abortion.180 In
later years, Kennedy would maintain his alliance with the prochoice movement.181
176. See infra notes 257–62 and accompanying text (discussing this
progression to radicalism).
177. See Harold Schmeck, Health Agency Report Proposes Limits on Fetal
Experiments, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1973, at 12 (“[S]taff members of the National
Institutes of Health recommends [sic] prohibiting any experiments that would
prolong the life of an aborted fetus once its ultimate survival was judged to be
impossible.”).
178. See NARAL, Senator Edward Kennedy (c. 1972) (relating Kennedy’s
pre-Roe opposition to “abortion on demand”) (on file with Schlesinger Library,
Harvard University, Carton 1, The NARAL Papers, Carton 1, Folder “NARAL
Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, 1974–75”).
179. See id. (responding to and criticizing Senator Kennedy’s remarks).
180. See, e.g., Marjorie Hunter, Senate Upholds U.S. Abortion Funds, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1975, at 28 (reporting that Kennedy opposed the bill because he
feared it would discriminate against the poor).
181. See, e.g., Amy H. Nemko, Case Note, Saving FACE: Clinic Access Under
a New Commerce Clause, 106 YALE L.J. 525, 527 (1996) (discussing Kennedy’s
role in reducing violence directed at reproductive health facilities).
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Nonetheless, like other commentators, Kennedy saw some
form of fetal protections as compatible with abortion rights.182 In
May 1973, the generally pro-choice New York Times hinted at the
complexity of the relationship between fetal research and
abortion: “[D]oes anyone have the right to research on it without
consent—and whose consent? The mother would ordinarily be the
one to ask, but she has already asked for an abortion. Can she be
said to have the best interest of the fetus at heart?”183
When Congress held hearings on the subject of fetal
research, Kennedy questioned “where if at all, [the] issue
overlap[ped]with the abortion issue.”184 Just the same, Kennedy
framed fetal research as one example of unregulated and often
harmful human experimentation.185 In the 1970s, a number of
medical scandals had attracted national media attention. One
such scandal emerged in July 1972, when the Associated Press
ran a story revealing the details of the Tuskegee study, a project
begun forty years before on the effects of untreated syphilis on
African–American men.186 The 400 men involved in the study had
no idea what the study involved, and no test subject had received
proper treatment.187 Other concerns surrounded public
revelations about involuntary sterilizations.188 To some observers,
182. See O. Carter Snead, Science, Public Bioethics, and the Problem of
Integration, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1529, 1538–39 (describing Edward Kennedy’s
role in passing the National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342
(1974), legislation designed to evaluate the ethical principles of human
research).
183. Harold M. Schmeck Jr., What Price Research?: Fetuses Medicine, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 1973, at 252.
184. Fetal Research, 1974: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S.
Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 93d Cong. 2 (1974) (statement of Sen.
Edward Kennedy) [hereinafter Fetal Research Hearing].
185. See id. at 7 (reciting Kennedy’s questioning about fetal research
causing mental retardation).
186. See, e.g., Jean Heller, Syphilis Victims in U.S. Went Untreated for 40
Years, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1972, at 1 (describing the participants as “guinea
pigs” and noting they never received treatment even after effective syphilis
medicine emerged).
187. See, e.g., id. at 1, 8 (stating that no doctor prescribed antibiotics for the
syphilis patients). For further analysis of the “Tuskegee Experiment,” see
generally SUSAN REVERBY, TUSKEGEE’S TRUTHS: RETHINKING THE TUSKEGEE
SYPHILIS STUDY (2000); JAMES HOWARD JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE
SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1993).
188. See, e.g., REBECCA MARIE KLUCHIN, FIT TO BE TIED: STERILIZATION AND
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fetal research represented another example of victimization
through human experimentation.189
In 1974, congressional hearings made apparent the
distinctions between fetal research and abortion. Pro-life witness
Andre Hellegers reasoned: “The case can no longer be argued
under slogans such ‘Every woman has a right to control her own
body’ since the fetus is no longer inside her body . . . . In brief,
there is no longer any possible conflict between the fetus and its
mother.”190
In the absence of a conflict, could the fetus have any rights?
Dr. Richard Behrman, a champion of fetal research, argued that
decisions about fetal research “should be made by an uncoerced
and reasonably adequately informed individual or individuals
whose interests are substantially overlapping or identical to those
of the proposed subject.”191 Kennedy believed that true protection
required the establishment of a permanent scientific commission
that would supervise all human experimentation, including any
concerning fetuses.192
The 1974 hearings raised a number of difficult questions for
the pro-choice movement. Did pro-choice activists logically have
to oppose restrictions on fetal research? Could activists reconcile
fetal rights with women’s interest in reproductive autonomy?
These questions proved difficult for some pro-choice
organizations. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a
leading pro-choice organization, actually adopted a vision of fetal
rights.
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN AMERICA 190 (2009) (describing some doctors’
resistance and dismissal of sterilization reform); Sterilization: Newest Threat to
the Poor, EBONY, Oct. 1973, at 150, 150–53 (evaluating sterilization with special
attention to its relationship with welfare).
189. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-224, at 11–12 (1973) (finding that the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce “feels the present standards of ethical
conduct make research on living fetuses unethical”).
190. Fetal Research Hearing, supra note 184, at 95 (statement of Andre
Hellegers, Director of the Kennedy Institute for Bioethics at Georgetown
University).
191. Id. at 49 (statement of Richard Behrman, Chairman of the Department
of Pediatrics at Columbia University).
192. See Harold M. Schmeck Jr., Conferees Agree to Ban Research on Live
Fetus, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1974, at 1 (stating although Kennedy favored a
permanent national commission, the compromise established one for two years).
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B. The ACLU and Fetal Rights

In the mid-1970s, the ACLU made a major contribution to
the advancement of abortion rights. The organization’s
Reproductive Rights Freedom Project, founded in 1974, led efforts
to defend Roe in the courts.193 Nonetheless, the ACLU Privacy
Committee proposed protections for fetal rights that its members
believed to be consistent with Roe.
At a June 1976 meeting, the Committee members concluded
that women’s interests took priority, but if a woman had nothing
to lose from the choice of one procedure or another, the state
should recognize fetal rights.194 The Committee focused on
whether the Roe decision precluded any recognition of fetal
rights: “Do we define abortion as relieving the mother of the
pregnancy or as killing the fetus?”195 The question set the agenda
for latter battles within the ACLU.196
In October 1976, disagreement within the Committee
intensified. One member present took the position that the
Fourteenth Amendment created “an affirmative obligation to
protect and support life.”197 A child welfare expert argued that
the Committee should “adopt the position that the right to abort
is the right to kill,” which was Roe’s “full implication[ ].”198 Others
insisted that “the medical profession [should] make decisions”
about the breadth of abortion rights.199
In October and November, the Committee agreed to
recognize fetal rights, all the while balancing them against a
woman’s paramount right to reproductive freedom.200 While
193. See STAGGENBORG, supra note 64, at 59 (discussing the ACLU’s legal
efforts after Roe).
194. See ACLU MEETING MINUTES, June 1976, supra note 22, at 2 (stating
“the doctor should choose the method that keeps the baby alive”).
195. Id. at 3.
196. See id. (acknowledging that the questions posed at the meeting will
control the Committee’s agenda for the rest of the year).
197. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PRIVACY COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES,
OCTOBER 13, 1976, at 1 (1976) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University,
Box 112, The ACLU Papers, Folder 8 “Rare Books and Manuscripts Division”).
198. Id. at 2.
199. Id. at 3.
200. See Memorandum from Barbara Kaiser to Am. Civil Liberties Union
Privacy Comm. 1 (Nov. 30, 1976) [hereinafter “Memorandum from Barbara
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acknowledging that “the rights of the fetus can be limited by
practical considerations,” the Committee concluded that “society
must accept responsibility if the mother desires to be relieved of
her obligation.”201 The Committee also recognized that the
knowledge that the fetus would survive might chill women’s
reproductive decisionmaking, particularly late in a pregnancy.202
Nonetheless, in November, the Committee concluded that women
had no right to avoid knowing the “fate of the fetus,” given the
importance of both fetal rights and the First Amendment
interests of those who would otherwise speak out on the
matter.203
The Committee turned next to the issue of fetuses that
survived an abortion procedure.204 Again, the Committee
reasoned that fetal rights and women’s abortion rights could
coexist.205 Without threatening legal abortion, the Committee
believed, the state could give the fetus rights to medical care after
the completion of an abortion.206 As importantly, in any state that
restricted abortion, the fetus had a right to financial support.207
In 1975, the federal government similarly tried to separate
the issues of abortion and fetal rights. Congress chartered a
group to study the question—the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare’s National Commission for the Protection
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research—the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare—which approved
Kaiser] (stating that if a fetus is born alive, the physician should use “all
available means to save its life”) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton
University, Box 112, The ACLU Papers, Folder 8 “Rare Books and Manuscripts
Division”).
201. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 197, at 2.
202. See id. at 2 (expressing concern that the recognition of fetal rights may
“have an impact on a woman’s decision-making”).
203. Memorandum from Barbara Kaiser, supra note 200, at 2.
204. See id. (discussing that “fetal salvage” would vary based on hospital
capabilities).
205. See id. (prioritizing the mother’s life but granting a fetal right to live as
a secondary priority).
206. See id. (“[I]f the fetus should be born alive, it would be incumbent upon
the doctors to keep it alive.”).
207. See id. at 2 (agreeing that the state should assume responsibility for
the nurture of the child if the state mandated physicians to take all efforts to
save a fetus born alive).
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regulations requiring the preclearance of any research that
harmed a fetus.208 The Commission required researchers to use
only fetuses under twenty weeks of age and to show that their
research did not compromise the chances of fetal survival.209 Like
the ACLU Privacy Committee, the Commission discussed fetal
rights as a subject that could be separated from abortion.210
This Article next examines some of the reasons that
collaboration between pro-choice and pro-life activists became so
difficult later in the 1970s. The ACCL’s project ran into difficulty
as the pro-life movement forged a lasting partnership with the
Republican Party.211 By the early 1980s, constitutional and
political support for welfare rights had eroded, and the pro-life
movement had adopted the social and fiscal conservatism of its
new partners.212
Political party realignment also undermined the kind of fetal
rights proposal explored by the ACLU. The pro-life partnership
with the New Right made its cause appear both antifeminist and
anti-woman. In the same period, activists prioritized the passage
of multirestriction laws, like those introduced in Akron, Ohio, and
the State of Missouri.213 These laws limited access to abortion in a
variety of ways, and many multirestriction bills also addressed
fetal research, the choice of abortion procedure, or post-abortion
fetal care.214 For pro-choice activists, these laws served as further
evidence of pro-life desire to keep women in traditional roles.215 If
all fetal-rights laws sought to keep women in their place, pro-

208. See, e.g., Weinberger Moves to End Ban on Research Involving Fetuses,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1975, at 11 (describing new rules in place after the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare lifted the ban).
209. See, e.g., id. (discussing the rules for both therapeutic and
nontherapeutic fetal research).
210. See id. (providing for therapeutic research if there was no substantial
risk to the fetus).
211. Infra Part V.A.
212. Infra Part V.A.
213. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 421–
22 (1983) (describing the Akron ordinance); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 52 (1976) (describing a Missouri statute of this kind).
214. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo., 428 U.S. at 58–59
(describing the Missouri act at issue).
215. Infra Part V.B.
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choice leaders believed, there was no way to reconcile the rights
of women and unborn children.
V. Radicalization Outside the Court
Scholars have attributed a great deal of post-Roe polarization
to the Supreme Court’s sweeping decision. As Reva Siegel and
Linda Greenhouse have shown, well before 1973, leaders of the
Republican Party had their own reasons for escalating the
abortion conflict.216 As this Part contends, the struggle ratcheted
up after 1973 for reasons having little to do with the Supreme
Court. Beginning in the mid-1970s, political party realignment
accelerated.217 Socially conservative, evangelical Protestants
mobilized to an unprecedented extent.218 Political operatives like
Paul Weyrich and direct-mail guru Richard Viguerie used
abortion to bring new voters into the Republican Party, as did
then-presidential candidate Ronald Reagan.219 Pro-lifers had
financial, ideological, and political reasons for partnering with
the New Right.220 In forging a working relationship with social
conservatives, abortion opponents took more extreme and
consistently right-wing positions on a number of gender issues.221
In response, pro-choice leaders expressed skepticism about any
effort to recognize fetal rights.222 For reasons having little to do
with the Court, movement members, politicians, and political
operatives deliberately and consistently made decisions that
intensified abortion conflict.
216. See generally Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 16.
217. See Mary Zeigler, The Framing of a Right to Choose: Roe v. Wade and
the Changing Debate on Abortion Law, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 281, 325 (2009)
(asserting that Kennedy shifted to pro-choice views in order to support racial
and social equality).
218. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 16, at 2065 (analyzing the pro-life
appeal for conservative evangelical protestants).
219. See id. at 2062–64 (discussing Viguerie’s and Weyrich’s political ideas
to engage Protestants).
220. See id. at 2065 (asserting that these pro-lifers related to the “broadbased attack on cultural developments evangelical critics termed ‘secular
humanism’”).
221. See id. at 2060–61 (listing some of the gender issues that abortion
opponents would begin to oppose).
222. Supra Part IV.
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A. Moving to the Right

As Daniel Williams has shown, the leaders of the emerging
New Right viewed abortion as a promising wedge issue.223 The
New Right, a name chosen by its leaders, emerged in the wake of
the Watergate scandal.224 Weyrich, Viguerie, and their partners
wanted to create a conservative movement outside the
mainstream Republican Party.225 Social issues, like abortion,
promised to win the support of Catholics, fundamentalist
Christians, and others who conventionally voted for the
Democratic Party.226
The New Right intensified conflict about abortion for political
ends. In 1979, Weyrich and Viguerie met with Jerry Falwell and
other leading evangelical Protestants to craft a conservative
political agenda that would suit the newly active base.227 In
framing a pro-family agenda, Weyrich “proposed . . . that abortion
be made the keystone of [a new] organizing strategy, since that
was the issue that could divide the Democratic Party.”228 Weyrich
and the New Right took a number of concrete steps to deepen
public divisions about abortion. Weyrich helped to fund the
formation of absolutist pro-life organizations, like the American
Life Lobby, and a pro-life political action committee, the Life

223. See DANIEL WILLIAMS, GOD’S OWN PARTY: THE MAKING OF THE CHRISTIAN
RIGHT 165–74 (2012) (“As New Right political operatives looked for controversial
issues to highlight their campaigns against congressional liberals, they turned
with increasing frequency to the subject of abortion.”).
224. See, e.g., DAVID H. BENNETT, THE PARTY OF FEAR: FROM NATIVIST
MOVEMENTS TO THE NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 393 (1988) (recounting how
Watergate particularly helped the business of Richard Viguerie).
225. See, e.g., BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION
DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 314 (Linda Greenhouse & Reva
Siegel eds., 2d ed. 2012) (stating these new Republicans wanted to realign voters
with social issues).
226. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 223, at 169–72 (discussing the appeal
the abortion issue possessed for the New Right).
227. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, RIGHT STAR RISING: A NEW POLITICS, 1974–
1980, at 274 (2010) (discussing the formation of the Moral Majority and its
religion-focused agenda); JOHN MICKELTHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE
RIGHT NATION: CONSERVATIVE POWER IN AMERICA 83–85 (2004) (describing the
Moral Majority’s derivation from evangelical groups).
228. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 16, at 2067.
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Amendment Political Action Committee (LAPAC), that worked to
put abortion on the top of the national political agenda.229
The abortion conflict also intensified as both political parties
cemented their positions on abortion. During the 1976
presidential primary, incumbent Gerald Ford had identified as a
moderate, refusing to take any position on a fetal-life amendment
to the Constitution.230 By contrast, Ford’s opponent, Ronald
Reagan, took a strong pro-life position, drawing on movement
rhetoric and endorsing a fetal-life amendment.231 Although Ford
defeated Reagan in the primary (and ultimately lost the election),
Reagan’s commitments made him a “darling of abortion
opponents.”232 His unsuccessful primary run made clear the
potential of abortion as an election issue.233 Promising pro-life
voters dramatic constitutional and social change would, the
argument went, bring Republicans a large and energetic group of
new voters.234
Why was an alliance with the New Right and the Republican
Party appealing to a diverse pro-life movement? As Part III
suggests, some movement members endorsed welfare rights for
women that would more easily fit in the Democratic, rather than
Republican, party platform.235 Nonetheless, by the late 1970s,
movement leaders had reason to join a larger conservative
229. See BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra note 225, at 294 (analyzing how
Viguerie and Weyrich planned to use these pro-life organizations to gain
additional political capital and influence).
230. See DONALD CRITCHLOW, INTENDED CONSEQUENCES: BIRTH CONTROL,
ABORTION, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 204 (1999) (“While Ford declared
[Roe] must be upheld, he told a meeting of . . . Catholic Bishops that he believed
government had ‘a responsibility to protect life.’”); BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra
note 225, at 292 (indicating Ford initially opposed Roe yet remained quiet about
his views during his presidency despite his wife’s pro-choice stance).
231. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 223, at 187–89 (mentioning Reagan’s
pro-life stance as part of his “shining city upon a hill” rhetoric); LAURENCE
TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 149 (1992) (evaluating how
endorsing restoration of the right to life for fetuses demonstrated Reagan’s more
conservative Republican platform).
232. TRIBE, supra note 231, at 148.
233. See id. (asserting that, despite lacking a prominent role in the actual
election, abortion proved that it could affect substantial amounts of voters in the
Republican primaries).
234. See id. (noting that the abortion issue could play a pivotal role in the
largely Catholic northeast).
235. Supra Part III.
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alliance. Financially, the New Right promised abortion opponents
unprecedented support.236 Organizations like the Moral Majority
and Christian Voice had an impressive financial record.237 At one
point, in the late 1970s, the Moral Majority raised as much as $1
million a week.238 In 1978, the NRLC, the largest national pro-life
organization, had debts as large as $25,000.239 Working with
social conservatives promised to make the pro-life cause
financially stable.
Political influence also seemed likely to follow from a
partnership with social conservatives. After 1976, pro-life leaders
like Carolyn Gerster of the NRLC and Paul Brown of the Life
Amendment Political Action Committee began complaining about
the difficulty of winning new Democratic supporters in
Congress.240 By contrast, because of the influence of social
conservatives, the Republican Party nominated Reagan, a pro-life
stalwart, during the 1980 election season and endorsed an
antiabortion constitutional amendment.241
Working with the New Right and the Republican Party
reshaped the pro-life movement’s agenda. Before partnering with
social conservatives, many pro-life organizations took no formal
position on the ERA.242 Later in the 1970s, convinced by
236. See, e.g., MICKELTHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 227, at 84
(describing the impressive Evangelical resources at the disposal to leaders like
Falwell).
237. See, e.g., Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 587–88
(stating, for example, that Christian Voice raised $3 million for the presidential
campaign).
238. See id. (assessing Falwell’s audience at 2.5 million and noting they
supported the Moral Majority with up to a $1 million per week in December
1979).
239. See, e.g., CONNIE PAIGE, THE RIGHT TO LIFERS: WHO THEY ARE, HOW
THEY OPERATE, AND WHERE THEY GET THEIR MONEY 86–87 (1983) (considering
the organization in “chronic debt”).
240. See, e.g., John Herbers, Convention Speech Stirs Foes of Abortion:
Factor in Elections, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1979, at 16 (quoting Gerster’s wish
that the pro-life movement had not joined a broader social movement); John
Herbers, Sweeping Right to Life Goals Set as Movement Gains New Power, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1978, at A1 (describing Jones discussing the difficulty of
moderate political views gaining ground).
241. On the 1980 platform, see generally Stuart Taylor, Jr., Politics of the
Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1980, at A23; LISA TAYLOR, FEMINISTS AND PARTY
POLITICS 96 (2000).
242. See NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM., BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING

BEYOND BACKLASH

1009

antifeminists and New Right leaders that the Amendment would
make it impossible to overrule Roe, pro-lifers condemned the
Amendment.243 As other members of the New Right coalition
worked to undo the impact of decisions by the Warren and Burger
Courts,244 pro-lifers took up the cause of opposing judicial
activism, signaling opposition to decisions on matters from school
prayer to busing.245
Political party realignment made the ACCL’s project much
more challenging.246 For many in the pro-life movement, common
ground involved the provision of welfare rights for women.247
Abortion opponents like Mecklenburg believed that women who
chose abortion were vulnerable and deserving of state support.248
During the 1980 election, however, Ronald Reagan tapped
into public anxieties about the size, cost, and inefficiency of the
welfare state. As Governor of California, Reagan had pioneered a
“required work” program designed to cut the cost of entitlement

MINUTES, SEPTEMBER 20–21, 1975, at 2 (1975) (opposing the adoption of the ERA
until its language became less ambiguous) (on file with Gerald Ford Memorial
Library, University of Michigan, Box 8, The American Citizens Concerned for
Life Papers).
243. See Letter from Judie Brown to Unnamed First Class Mailing
Recipients (Oct. 17, 1977) (advising recipients that the NRLC would oppose the
Equal Rights Amendment until it guaranteed rights to unborn Americans) (on
file with Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan, Box 10, The
American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Folder “Board of Directors,
1975(1)–(5)”).
244. For discussion of concern within the Religious Right and New Right
about school prayer and the Supreme Court, see WILLIAMS, supra note 223, at
60–67. For discussion of the New Right’s attack on busing, affirmative action,
and other matters addressed by the Warren and Burger Courts, see JEROME
HIMMELSTEIN, TO THE RIGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM
83 (1992).
245. See Mary Ziegler, Grassroots Originalism: Judicial Activism
Arguments, the Abortion Debate, and the Politics of Judicial Philosophy, 51 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 201, 220–32 (2012) (discussing pro-life adoption of
arguments about judicial activism).
246. See supra Part III.B (elaborating on the ACCL’s goals as it related to
welfare and abortion).
247. See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text (reflecting on the
ACCL’s approach on state welfare for women with unwanted pregnancies).
248. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text (“Mecklenburg’s ACCL
argued that both abortion and unintended pregnancy created psychiatric
distress.”).
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programs,249 and during the 1980 election, both Reagan and
incumbent Jimmy Carter agreed that the “welfare burden” had
become “too onerous for local governments to bear.”250 Following
his election, Reagan called for “fundamental reform” of
entitlement programs, making support available only to the
“truly needy.”251 In allying with the Republican Party and the
New Right, the pro-life movement signed on to a smallgovernment agenda.
As importantly, the vision of women’s rights advanced by
social conservatives differed dramatically from the ideas
Mecklenburg had promoted.252 Later in the 1970s, in the
campaign for the ERA, the New Right developed a different idea
of women’s rights. Like Mecklenburg’s allies, ERA supporters
believed that women and men were not yet equal.253 Led by
antifeminist Phyllis Schlafly, the New Right instead contended
that sex equality would harm, rather than help, women.254 In
1975, Schlafly contended that the ERA would “take away from
women the rights they already have, such as the right of a wife to
be supported by her husband, the right of a woman to be
exempted from military combat, and your right, if you wanted it,
to go to a single-sex college.”255 Pro-lifers gravitated toward this
vision of women’s rights partly because Schlafly successfully
249. Peter Kihss, Reagan Welfare Reform Called “Major Policy Success,”
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1980, at A17.
250. Joyce Purnick, Moynihan Hails a Carter Pledge on Welfare Cost, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1980, at B1.
251. Bernard Weinraub, Democrats Say Reagan Proposal Would Hit
Pensions of 1.2 Million, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1981, at B14. For a contemporary
analysis of Reagan’s view of the “needy,” see The Truly Needy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
20, 1981, at A26.
252. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing that
Mecklenburg sought child care, sex education, family planning, and educational
programs).
253. See, e.g., GAYLE YATES, WHAT WOMEN WANT: THE IDEAS OF THE
MOVEMENT 52 (1975) (explaining that feminists saw “the need for a more
extensive legal alleviation of discrimination against women”).
254. See Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights:
Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815,
827 (2007) (discussing how Phyllis Schlafly posed messages to women tied to
traditional family roles).
255. Judy Klemesrud, Opponent of E.R.A. Confident of Its Defeat, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 1975, at 53.
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argued—contrary to what many feminists maintained—that the
ERA would strengthen abortion rights.256 Schlafly explained in
1977 that feminists would soon learn that “‘the equal rights
amendment and abortion are antifamily goals, and not what the
American people want.’”257 That year, prominent abortion
opponents began attending anti-ERA rallies and adopting a
larger antifeminist agenda.258 ERA politics left little room for the
vision of women’s rights advanced by pro-lifers seeking common
ground. Schlafly’s battle suggested that abortion opponents could
not compromise with feminists without sacrificing the unborn.259
In this new climate, pro-life attorneys worked to redefine
what reproductive choice meant to the movement. Rather than
seeking other reproductive freedoms for women, pro-lifers could
use the language of choice exclusively to undercut Roe. Beginning
in the late 1970s, Americans United for Life (AUL), the pro-life
movement’s leading public interest litigation firm, elaborated on
this strategy in a string of victories in the courts.260 The AUL’s
strategy assumed that Roe was good law but sought to narrow its
protections.261 Describing abortion as a right to choose, in this
account, meant that the state had a broader power to regulate
abortion so long as women retained the ultimate decision.262 As
the AUL’s brief explained: “If the abortion decision is so
256. See Siegel, supra note 254, at 827–28 (discussing how the New Right
advocated against the ERA by equating it to the constitutionalizing of abortion).
257. Judy Klemesrud, Women’s Movement at Age 11: Larger, More Diffuse,
Still Battling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1977, at 63 (quoting Schlafly).
258. See, e.g., Judy Klemesrud, Equal Rights Plan and Abortion Are
Opposed by 15,000 at Rally, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1977, at 32 (describing
participation of Nellie Gray of March for Life and Mildred Jefferson of the
National Right to Life Committee in a major antifeminist rally).
259. See id. at 827 (asserting that Schlafy “mobilized opposition by framing
abortion and homosexuality as potent symbols of the new family form that ERA
would promote”).
260. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th Anniversary: A Moment of
Truth for the Anti-Abortion-Rights Movement?, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245,
261 (2013) (analyzing the AUL’s two-prong strategy of slowly attacking Roe’s
scope in litigation and creating legislation to protect pro-life interests).
261. See Siegel, supra note 20, at 1681 (describing the AUL as the
coordinator of “the national legislative strategy designed to chip away at Roe”).
262. See Brief for Americans United For Life as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 17, Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (No. 01-1015) (arguing that
even if a woman reaches her decision to abort a child, a public hospital should
not have to provide one if a physician finds it medically unnecessary).
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private . . . it follows that government shall not itself be
compelled to respond to the demand of the exercise of that
right.”263
In the new pro-life movement, moderates’ campaign for
reproductive choice appeared anomalous. Mecklenburg and her
allies had demanded protections against sex discrimination,
while the New Right argued that equality would be a step down
for women. Advocates like Mecklenburg fought for the expansion
of the welfare state that Reagan and the New Right intended to
attack. Roe did little to undercut pro-life efforts to seek out
compromise. However, later in the decade, changes to the
political landscape made these efforts to find common ground
more challenging.
As Part IV demonstrates, some in the pro-choice movement
also sought consensus, exploring ways in which the state could
protect fetal rights without undermining reproductive autonomy.
By the early 1980s, pro-choice leaders viewed any fetal-protective
law with much more skepticism. Two developments undermined
any pro-choice interest in fetal rights. First, the New Right and
the Religious Right made abortion part of a broader antifeminist
agenda.264 In the new political climate, supporters of abortion
rights more often saw fetal-protective laws as a vehicle for
enforcing traditional gender roles. In the same period, abortion
opponents promoted multirestriction laws designed to decrease
access to abortion.265 These laws often included measures that
protected fetuses outside the abortion context. Pro-choice
activists began to oppose any fetal protective law, viewing such
measures as an attack on Roe.

263. Id. at 9.
264. See, e.g., Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Antiabortion, Antifeminism, and
the Rise of the New Right, FEMINIST STUDIES, Summer 1981, at 207 (describing
the New Right’s focus on antiabortion and anti-ERA goals at the 1980
Republican convention).
265. See, e.g., Brief for Americans United for Life as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 5–9, H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (No. 795903) (supporting a parental-notification law in Utah).
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B. Pro-Life and Antifeminist
Before the late 1970s, the pro-life movement had an
ambiguous relationship with second-wave feminism. Major
organizations like the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC)
took no position on major feminist reforms like the ERA.266 Other
organizations, like Feminists for Life, actively campaigned for the
Amendment and laws allowing married women to take credit in
their names.267 Even pro-choice activists viewed the pro-life
movement as theocratic rather than antifeminist, imposing one
set of religious beliefs on the rest of the country.268
In working with the New Right, the pro-life movement
radically revised its positions. In the late 1970s, organizations
like the NRLC came out against the ERA and campaigned
against funding for feminist conferences like the one celebrating
International Women’s Year.269 Pro-lifers’ alliance with the New
Right made antiabortion activism appear synonymous with social
conservatism.270 Pro-choice activists began to conclude that
antifeminism motivated abortion opponents rather than religion
or fetal rights. In a January 1978 fundraising letter, for example,
NOW President Eleanor Smeal warned of “[a] major attack on
[women’s] rights.”271 In a New York Times editorial in June 1978,
former NARAL leader Larry Lader presented the pro-life
movement as an offshoot of far-right radicalism.272 In 1980,
Planned Parenthood President Faye Wattleton described abortion
266. See, e.g., Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 576
(noting that the NRLC took no position on the ERA until 1977).
267. See generally Ziegler, Rights on the Right, supra note 99.
268. See, e.g., Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 575
(describing how Mecklenburg realized she needed to split away from the
Catholic Church into a secular entity if she wanted the public to characterize
her pro-life views associated with female welfare rather than theology).
269. See, e.g., id. at 585–88 (“As abortion opponents became convinced that
both the ERA and feminism were pro-abortion, groups like the NRLC began to
condemn both in equal measure.”).
270. See id. at 588–89 (discussing how pro-life activists began endorsing
unrelated, socially conservative reforms).
271. Dorothy Collins, Abortion: The Issue Still Burns, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 23,
1978, at 1.
272. See Larry Lader, Abortion Opponent’s Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
1978, at 19 (deeming the pro-life contingency “the spearhead of political
fanaticism”).
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opponents as “an increasingly vocal and at times violent minority
which seeks to deny all of us our fundamental rights of privacy
and individual decision-making.”273 To many in the pro-choice
movement, pro-lifers’ partnership with the New Right made fetalrights rhetoric appear to be nothing more than an effective
repackaging of sexist views.
The new strategy adopted by pro-lifers reinforced this
impression. Beginning in the mid-1970s, abortion opponents
worked harder to promote multipart laws restricting access to
abortion.274 Statutes and city ordinances required informed
consent, spousal and parental consent.275 Other laws prohibited
saline abortions, required life-saving fetal care after an abortion,
or defined fetal viability more narrowly than had the Roe
Court.276 These laws framed all fetal-protective measures as
efforts to ban abortion.277
These efforts raised concerns that pro-lifers would use any
recognition of fetal rights to attack Roe. If fetal-protective laws
set a precedent for efforts to undermine abortion, the pro-choice
movement could not support fetal rights without weakening the
foundation for abortion rights.278
Immediately after Roe, activists on both sides of the abortion
issue believed that compromise was both possible and desirable.
The escalation of conflict came later, with little input from the
courts. In the late 1970s, political party realignment that began
before Roe accelerated. With the emergence of the New Right and
the Religious Right, the Republican Party adopted a robust social
conservatism, and the pro-life movement gained powerful new
partners. Political reordering created new obstacles for those
seeking common ground.
273. Planned Parenthood Shifting to a Patriotic Theme, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
1980, at 25.
274. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (describing states with
multirestriction laws).
275. Supra note 214 and accompanying text.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PRIVACY COMMITTEE MEETING
MINUTES, OCTOBER 13, 1979, at 1 (1979) (advising the committee that abortion
should consist of killing the fetus, rather than removing the pregnancy, in order
to protect Roe’s holding) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, Box
112, The ACLU Papers, Folder 8 “Rare Books and Manuscripts Division”).
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The history of Roe’s aftermath spotlights the influence of
nonjudicial actors on post-Roe polarization. If we focus less
exclusively on the Court, what difference does it make to
contemporary scholarship? Part VI takes up this question next.
VI. Roe and the Consequences of Judicial Review
Backlash arguments address the consequences of asking too
much of the courts.279 Backlash theorists use history to caution
social movements against overreliance on the courts.280 Roe,
however, serves as an example of the dangers faced by courts as
well as by activists.281 Using Roe as a paradigm, beyond backlash
arguments illustrate the harms that judicial decisions can do to
both the authority of the Court and to the larger society. In
particular, scholars point to post-Roe polarization as a cost of
judicial intervention in abortion politics.282 By moving too fast,
the Court alienated the pro-life movement, undid promising
compromises, and hopelessly radicalized discussion.
Reasoning from Roe, legal scholars have developed a
compelling account of the political costs of different interpretive
methods. Richard Posner sees Roe as an example of the damage
done by courts that reject or misunderstand pragmatism.283
Pragmatism asks the courts to consider, among other things, how
to formulate opinions with desirable consequences.284 A more
pragmatic Court, Posner predicts, would have arrived at a
solution that would have commanded widespread support.285 Cass
279. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 16, at 2028 (discussing backlash).
280. See id. at 2072 (stating that scholars often assume that Roe started the
abortion conflict).
281. See supra Part II (describing how Roe does not fit into the conventional
backlash framework).
282. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 4, at 82 (asserting that Roe empowered
those extremists on either side of the abortion debate).
283. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 79 (stating Roe has deadlocked the
experimentation and regulation of abortion).
284. For a brief discussion of Posner’s understanding of pragmatism, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 27 (1993).
285. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 125 (providing an example of a less
binding holding, upholding the Texas statute at issue, in order to maintain a
semblance of democratic input).
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Sunstein similarly uses Roe to showcase the benefits of an
alternative theory that he calls minimalism.286 Because Roe came
down at a time when abortion was still divisive, the Court made a
mistake by issuing a broad and philosophical ruling.287 Roe’s
sweep undercut a process of state-by-state negotiation that could
have lowered the temperature of debate and provided more
opportunities for compromise.288
William Eskridge also views Roe as a prime source of
polarization. Eskridge advises the courts to craft decisions that
lower the stakes of ordinary politics and facilitate democratic
deliberation.289 In issuing a far-reaching decision before any
consensus formed, Roe convinced pro-life Americans that they
could not accomplish their goals through working in ordinary
politics.290 By alienating so many activists, Eskridge suggests,
Roe unnecessarily escalated the abortion conflict.291
Scholars like Eskridge, Sunstein, and Posner further use Roe
in issuing prescriptions for courts concerned with the social and
political costs of judicial review. As the Article has shown,
however, the narrative on which they rely is flawed. The
radicalization of abortion politics occurred gradually and in
response to more than the Court’s decision.292 In the late 1960s
and 1970s, abortion became a national political question, and
leading Republican operatives used it to court new voters.293
Other scholars have shown that Roe alone did not produce
286. For explanation of Sunstein’s minimalism, see generally CASS
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
(2001).
287. See id. at 114 (suggesting the Court should proceeded narrowly, “in
good minimalist fashion”).
288. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 4, at 766 (arguing that a lack of
compromise empowered the religious conservatives).
289. See William Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can
Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L. J. 1279, 1302
(2005) (“Because strict enforcement invests the political process with greater
neutrality, it contributes to lower stakes.”).
290. See id. at 1312 (contending Roe threatened our democracy, radicalized
traditionalists, and disowned pro-life Americans at least to an extent).
291. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 35, at 242–43 (discussing how
the decision took the most moral issues away from families and states).
292. Supra Part V.
293. See supra note 227 and accompanying text (discussing the leaders of
the New Right movement).
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hopelessly divided abortion politics. This Article adds a new
dimension to the discussion by showing that, for almost a decade
after the decision, abortion politics little resembled the bitter,
dysfunctional debate with which so many have found fault.294
To activists on both sides of the abortion issue, compromise
seemed not only possible but strategically crucial. In the 1970s,
pro-choice activists conducted a thoughtful conversation about
whether and how fetal rights and women’s rights could coexist.295
Supporters of abortion rights imagined fetal rights to financial
support, informed consent by proxy, and a chance of survival.296
At the same time, these advocates reaffirmed their support for
women’s right to the safest abortion procedure available.297 Roe
did not obscure potential differences between abortion and
questions of fetal rights ex utero.
Some pro-life advocates also sought common ground in
response to Roe. Far from arguing that there was no right to
reproductive choice, moderate abortion opponents instead
reworked the idea of privacy advanced by the Roe Court.298 These
activists rejected the idea that a right to choose covered abortion.
In other ways, however, they demanded broader reproductive
rights than those set forth in Roe.299 As moderates framed it,
reproductive choice required state support for motherhood—
public funding for day care, contraception, and health care, to be
sure, but also protections against sex and pregnancy
discrimination.
Legal scholars urge judges to use Roe’s history in measuring
the consequences of any potential decision.300 As the Article
shows, however, we have mistakenly blamed Roe for events that
occurred later and partly without the influence of the courts.
Insofar as Roe offers an example, beyond backlash arguments
294. See supra notes 240–45 and accompanying text (describing the political
shift at the beginning of the 1980s).
295. Supra Part IV.B.
296. Supra notes 204–07 and accompanying text.
297. Supra notes 200–03 and accompanying text.
298. Supra Part V.A.
299. See supra notes 262–63 (describing new pro-life legal strategies).
300. See supra notes 284–91 and accompanying text (analyzing different
scholars’ opinions on Roe’s judicial discretion).
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exaggerate the influence of judicial decisions, neglecting the
impact, motives, and negotiations of nonjudicial actors. That is
not to say that judicial decisions do not matter or that legal
scholars should not study the consequences of different modes of
decision making. If Roe teaches us anything, however, it is that
the courts play only one part in a much more complex process.
More accurately assessing Roe’s significance makes apparent
new questions about abortion law and judicial review. Did Roe
have any negative impact on abortion politics, albeit one less
central than we might have previously believed? How did we
come to believe that Roe produced a depressingly radicalized
debate so much earlier and so much more thoroughly than is the
case? A better historical understanding of consensus-seeking
efforts after Roe is only the beginning of this inquiry.
This Article suggests that any lessons offered by Roe’s history
for students of judicial review are more complex and less
predictive than we have often thought. On its own, the Court did
not cause and could hardly have anticipated the polarization of
gender politics in the early 1980s. If judges wish to learn from
Roe’s aftermath, the lesson is not a simple one involving the costs
of judicial decisions that do too much too soon. If anything, Roe’s
history suggests that legal academics need to attend better to the
influence of nonjudicial actors on constitutional politics and on
the meaning of blockbuster judicial decisions.
The history of compromise in the wake of Roe also provides a
much needed dose of optimism about the future prospects in the
abortion wars. For different reasons, Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg describe Roe as an obstacle to the creation of a more
rational and collaborative abortion debate.301 Since the 1973
decision, the argument goes, nonjudicial actors have substantially
less power to lower the stakes of abortion politics. The history
examined here offers a more hopeful story. After Roe, activists on
301. Dissenting in Casey, Scalia concluded that Roe “destroyed the
compromises of the past, rendered compromise impossible for the future” and
inflamed . . . national politics.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 995 (1992). Justice Ginsburg has also contended that because the Court
acted too quickly and disavowed an Equal Protection rationale, Roe “halted a
political process that was moving in a reform direction and thereby . . .
prolonged divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the issue.” Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1208 (1992).
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both sides of the abortion issue followed creative paths toward
compromise.302 The Court did not make these projects impossible
to pursue. By extension, when the abortion battle intensified, a
variety of nonjudicial actors, including politicians, activists, and
operatives, shared responsibility.303 The world of 1970s abortion
politics is in many ways removed from our own. Nonetheless, the
story of Roe’s aftermath suggests that we can do more than we
think to lower the temperature of the abortion wars.
Finally, the history of responses to Roe foregrounds the
importance of legal solutions related to, but separate from,
abortion. In the 1970s, compromise-minded activists appeared as
unwilling to negotiate about the scope of abortion rights as are
any advocates today. Nonetheless, for many on either side of the
issue, Roe made more urgent the search for legal solutions that
would lower the stakes of the abortion wars. Abortion opponents
primarily looked for ways to reduce the need for abortion, both by
targeting discrimination against women and by ensuring that
women had adequate resources to support themselves. Pro-choice
advocates searched for ways to dignify fetal life that would not
directly undermine abortion rights.
Both strategies may have some promise today. Since at least
the 1990s, leading voices in the pro-life movement have argued
for the importance of demonstrating concern for women as well as
for unborn children.304 On the pro-choice side, some organizations
representing abortion providers have called for a more nuanced
discussion of fetal life and fetal dignity.305

302. Compare supra notes 99–135 and accompanying text (describing
Mecklenburg’s ACCL priorities), with supra notes 195–210 and accompanying
text (establishing what the ACLU considered fetal rights).
303. See supra notes 240–45 and accompanying text (describing the political
shift at the beginning of the 1980s).
304. See Siegel, supra note 20, at 1656–78 (evaluating on more modern
issues relating to women and abortion).
305. See, e.g., Frances Kissling, Is There Life after Roe? How to Think about
ISSUES
INST.
(Winter
2004/2005),
http://www.
the
Fetus,
LIFE
lifeissues.org/breakingnews/2004/bn12-10-04fa.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2014)
(asserting the values of both female choice and fetal rights) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, Nat’l Coalition of Abortion
Providers, Abortion Providers Acknowledge Terminating Potential Human Life
(Nov. 19, 1992) (releasing that, as abortion clinics, they do kill fetuses that, if
born, would be babies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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For the most part, however, activists have argued that the
other side’s position on abortion has destructive effects. Recently,
with the advent of what Reva Siegel calls woman-protective
antiabortion arguments, pro-lifers have stressed the ways in
which abortion harms women.306 Since the early 1970s, pro-choice
activists have asserted that abortion bans are anti-life and antichild, harming children who are born to parents who do not want
or cannot adequately provide for them.307 If anything, these
arguments have exacerbated abortion conflict. Woman-protective
arguments not only justify abortion restrictions but also draw on
sex stereotypes that are offensive to many in the pro-choice
movement. In turn, pro-choice arguments about the damage done
to unwanted children do not square with pro-life claims that all
lives, particularly those of the disabled, are equally worthy.
Social-movement responses to Roe suggest that compromise
on related gender issues may be easier to achieve. Pro-life
organizations like All Our Lives endorse access to contraception
or legislation protecting women against domestic violence—goals
endorsed by many feminist and pro-choice organizations.308 It
may still be possible to create the kind of solution Roe supposedly
destroyed.
VII. Conclusion
Can courts fuel social change? In answering this question,
legal scholars and members of the Supreme Court turn to
reactions to Roe. For backlash theorists, Roe illustrates the ways
in which judicial decisions can set back a cause the Justices
endorse. For other observers, Roe serves as an example of the
306. See Siegel, supra note 20, at 1656–78 (providing a history of the
woman-protective antiabortion argument).
307. See, e.g., Unwanted Child is Called Victim, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1969,
at 66 (discussing that unwanted children often have higher occurrences of child
abandonment, abuse, and neglect); Reginald Stewart, Akron Divided by Heated
Abortion Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1978, at A10 (evaluating a rift in the city
council).
308. See, e.g., Jen R., The Government Shutdown: Harming Real Lives, ALL
OUR LIVES PAST ACTIONS BLOG (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.allourlives.org/thegovernment-shutdown-harming-real-lives/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (alerting
readers to the risk the government shutdown posed to domestic-violence and
rape-crisis shelters) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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damage judicial review can do the larger society. According to
this account, opinions that do too much too soon produce
polarization, undermine productive negotiations, and deform
social-movement politics.
This Article offers a more nuanced perspective on the role
played by the Court in gender politics. Far from putting an end to
efforts to identify common ground, Roe intensified attempts made
by some pro-choice and pro-life activists to find some form of
consensus. When these efforts stalled, a variety of nonjudicial
actors had at least as much responsibility as the Court.
Forty years later after it was decided, Roe remains one of the
most iconic and impactful Supreme Court decisions of the past
century—a touchstone for those seeking to understand the
Court’s role in American politics. We are right to believe that Roe
matters, but in attributing so much about contemporary politics
to the Court’s decision, we have lost sight of the world left in
Roe’s wake and the reasons for its disappearance. What, then,
does Roe remind us? The lesson does not simply involve the
influence of judicial review or the intractable polarization of the
abortion debate. If Roe should serve as a symbol of anything, it is
the complex interplay between party politics, social-movement
strategy, and Supreme Court politics. By building on a deeper
understanding of Roe’s history, we will better able to understand
that complexity.

